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THE RADIO REFERENCE AND ONWARD:
EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL JURISDICTION
OVER GENERAL CONTENT IN
BROADCASTING?
By J. SCOTT WILKIE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The constitutional position regarding control over general content in
broadcasting programming is based on a surprisingly small number of cases
that wholly omit to consider the possible bases of a sharing of provincial and
federal jurisdiction in this area. As the law is now interpreted, the provinces
are excluded from any legislative role in the general broadcasting content area.
The purpose of this paper is to examine critically some aspects of the
accepted constitutional position as it has developed and, from the conclusions
derived from this analysis, to posit theoretical, practical, constitutional, doc-
trinal, and legal process reasons why the provinces should and can have a
legislative involvement in the regulation of broadcasting content. Moreover,
the analysis will demonstrate why the courts' approach has been couched in
terms too simplistic to satisfy the legal and practical complexities of the sub-
ject.
By doctrinal extension and interpretation, the jurisdiction under The
British North America Act, 1867, with respect to general broadcasting con-
tent, appears to be solidly entrenched in the federal sphere of authority.
However, the legitimacy of this result, which may have considerable doctrinal
force, if the commentary of some constitutional scholars is to be accepted,1
has rested virtually unexplored and untested in any functional way. In com-
munications law in general, there is a "dearth" 2 of scholarly research. This is
particularly true of the constitutional issues posed by the content question,
which, in the modem federal structure, is a very real matter of contention.
© Copyright, 1980, J. Scott Wilkie.
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I See Atkey, The Provincial Interest In Broadcasting Under the Canadian Constitu-
tion (1969), 1 Can. Comm. LR. 212; Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto:
Carswell, 1977) at 336-44; Mullan and Beaman, The Constitutional Implications of the
Regulation of Telecommunications (1973), 2 Queen's L.J. 67; Shaw, The Cities, Cable-
vision and the Constitution: A Case Study in Vaughan Township (1971), 29 Fac. L. Rev.
U. of T. 28; and Ont., 7 Report of the Royal Commission on Violence in the Communi-
cations Industry (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1977) at 299 ft.
2 McNairn, Transportation, Communication and the Constitution: The Scope of
Federal Jurisdiction (1969), 47 Can. B. Rev. 355 at 355.
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Since the 1932 Radio Reference,3 which is regarded as the cornerstone
of constitutional doctrine as it applies to broadcasting, control over general
broadcasting and its content has been assumed to be vested in the federal
Parliament. As will be shown, however, this case did not address the content
question directly as a substantive issue and there is reasonable doubt con-
cerning whether it is a necessary implication of the case that its purview was
meant to encompass content concerns. 4 Subsequent cases have either assumed,
or tried to rationalize, a contrary result in a manner that is wholly uncon-
vincing in light of careful analysis of the Radio Reference.
In large measure, this situation has resulted from an omission by courts
and academic analysts to address the basic question, which applies to broad-
casting as to. any other area of constitutional interest: "What is the matter of
broadcasting"? A concomitant issue which has also been neglected relates to
whether broadcasting is a uniform concept incapable of logical disaggregation
for jurisdictional purposes.
Until relatively recently, the absolute and uncompromising decisions
and dicta of the few cases that have addressed the question of constitutional
jurisdiction over broadcasting content would have foreclosed the issue to
further serious analysis, although apparent in these cases is a conception of the
character of broadcasting, reflected also in learned commentaries, 5 that betrays
a misunderstanding of the substantive and functional issues involved. This
misunderstanding has manifested itself not only in an oversimplification of
the essential character of broadcasting as a complex communications exercise;
more important, there has been a misperception of how the Constitution, direct-
ly silent on the matter of modem broadcasting and broadcasting content, can
or should be interpreted to resolve the jurisdictional complexities that arise
from the modern social and economic context which has become increasingly
reliant on broadcasting as a tool of human interaction.
The decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in three recent cases,
Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Television Comm'n,6
Re Public Service Board, Dionne and A.G. Can.,7 and A.G. Que. v. Kellogg's
Co. of Canada,8 instill new vigour into the practical and theoretical utility
of jurisdictional analysis in the area of broadcasting content. These cases do
not approach the issue of general broadcasting content in a direct or intro-
spective way, and this, in itself, creates the basis for an inference of doubt
about the force with which these decisions can or should be invoked to support
exclusive federal jurisdiction over the plausibly independent matter of general
3 Re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication, [1932] A.C. 304, [1932] 2
D.L.R. 81 (P.C.) [hereinafter Radio Reference].
4 Report, supra note 1.
5 See supra note 1.
6 (1977), 81 D.L.R. (3d) 609 (S.C.C.).
7 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 191, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 178.
8[1978] 2 S.C.R. 211, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 314.
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broadcasting content. However, these decisions will probably be viewed as
having a substantial impact in validating the accepted jurisdictional position,
and in setting the foundation upon which negotiations about constitutional
change in this area will take place. Accordingly, it is important to assess
critically the validity of the conclusions and implications of these cases as
they may apply to the content question, in order to determine if, in fact, true
constitutional jurisdictional imperatives flow from them and their predecessors
in adjudication. As the discussion will show, if these recent cases are accepted
at face value, Parliament has been entrusted with jurisdiction over anything,
no matter how peripheral, to which the rubric "broadcasting" may be attached,
subject to potentially successful attempts to avoid this result.9
The essential focus of this paper is on the potential legitimacy of pro-
vincial involvement in the legislative process with respect to general broad-
casting content. It is submitted that a- useful and doctrinally acceptable
provincial role exists on the basis of a functional interpretation of the con-
stitutional division of powers as applied to broadcasting. Given that such a
legitimate role can be shown to exist, the further concern of this analysis is
to determine how to effectuate this involvement by means of existing and
accepted constitutional doctrine. Furthermore, whatever the view that may be
taken of the proposed solution to the perhaps misconceived exclusivity of
federal jurisdiction, at the very least this paper will demonstrate that the
accepted division of broadcasting content powers is unsatisfactory from an
analytical point of view, and is justifiably unacceptable in a practical sense to
some or all of the provinces. 10
On any constitutional question, it is conceivable that the entire body of
constitutional jurisprudence could be brought to bear directly, indirectly, or
by analogy. However, since the purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate how
existing constitutional principles in general, and with respect to broadcasting
in particular, can accommodate a provincial legislative role in setting content
standards, this paper will confine itself to a critical extrapolation of "accepted"
doctrine to re-evaluate the unquestioned allocation of power over general
broadcasting content to Parliament. Adopting Weiler's analysis of consti-
tutional decisions as "marching in pairs,"" a line of analysis that will be
pursued in the course of this paper, the availability of constitutional precedent
to support almost any reasoned conclusion sought to be reached militates in
favour of seeking positively to find ways of effecting provincial legislative
involvement.
Within a framework of existing doctrinal conceptions, the structure of
this paper has a threefold orientation. Fundamental to the arguments in this
0 Id.; see discussion in the text accompanying notes 64-70, infra.
10 Quebec is probably the most vociferous of the provinces in seeking legislative
autonomy in broadcasting. This was clear at the most recent Federal-Provincial Consti-
tutional Conference in February, 1979. See Trueman, "Levesque Blocks Agreement On
Sharing of Cable Jurisdiction," The Globe and Mail, 7 Feb. 1979 at 9.
"1 See note 125, infra.
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paper is an examination of the current constitutional position with respect to
general broadcasting content through an historical analysis of its supporting
case law, including the Capital Cities, Dionne, and Kellogg's cases. A critique
of the result of this development will be undertaken from several perspectives.
In the course of this analysis it will become apparent that the ways in which the
content issue has been presented to the courts have diverted them from the
essential underlying jurisdictional concerns that the broadcasting cases raise.
The impression that the cases convey is one of ipse dixit "reasoning" which is
not only alarming and unnecessary, given the fertile scope for creative con-
stitutional analysis in this area, but is also responsible for the obfuscation of
jurisdictional needs in the broadcasting field.
After criticizing the existing constitutional position, the theoretical,
practical, and constitutional legitimacy of a provincial role in broadcasting
content regulation will be explored in depth, and a mechanism for making such
a role operational will be suggested. In large measure, the suggested approach
is dependent on the adoption by the courts of a functional view of any
provincial legislation that might be enacted.12
In exploring the rationale for the functional constitutional adjudication
essential to achieve the provincial role in affecting broadcasting content that
this paper envisages, it is necessary to evaluate and criticize the judicial per-
ception of the role of courts as constitutional decision makers and adjudi-
cators. In fact, the courts' attitude toward the division of powers and how that
division applies to broadcasting content regulation is at least as important
as the courts' perception of the substantive law in the field, which, as a result
of the judicial approach, has been cast in a mold of constitutional imperatives.
12 Already, the developing approach of the courts to the federal "Trade and Com-
merce" power under s. 91(2) of The British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict.,
c. 3, has demonstrated that Canadian courts are not precluded from accepting an ap-
pealingly constituted and well understood functional approach to constitutional decision
making. A number of cases are relevant in showing the "Trade and Commerce" power
as a "flow of commerce" concept, or perhaps even encompassing the "general regulation
of trade": R. v. Eastern Terminal Elevator Co., [1925] S.C.R. 434, [1925] 3 D.L.R. 1;
Re Natural Products Marketing Act, [1936] S.C.R. 398, [1936] 3 D.L.R. 622; Re The
Farm Products Marketing Act, [1957] S.C.R. 198, 7 D.LR. (2d) 257; Murphy v. C.P.R.,
[1958] S.C.R. 626, 15 D.LR. (2d) 145; R. v. Klassen (1960), 20 D.L.R. (2d) 406, 29
W.W.R. 369 (Man. C.A.); Caloil Inc. v. A.G. Can., [1971] S.C.R. 543; A.G. Man. v.
Man. Egg and Poultry Ass'n, "1971] S.C.R. 689, 19 D.L.R. (3d) 169; MacDonald
v. Vapour Canada Ltd. (1976), 66 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 7 N.R. 477 (S.C.C.); (the above are
excerpted in Whyte and Lederman, Canadian Constitutional Law (2d ed. Toronto: But-
terworths, 1977) at 8-5 to 8-76); Canadian Industrial Gas and Oil Ltd. v. Gov't o1 Sask.,
[1978] S.C.R. 545, 80 D.LR. (3d) 449, [1977] 6 W.W.R. 607; and Re Agricultural Prod-
ucts Marketing Act (1978), 19 N.R. 361 (S.C.C.).
However, the functional approach of the Court in this regard is not only concerned
with expanding the federal jurisdiction. Where appropriate, notwithstanding the existence
of "flow of commerce" considerations, the Court has protected provincial interest under
s. 92(13) of The British North America Act, 1867. See Carnation Co. v. Quebec Agri-
cultural Marketing Bd., [19681 S.C.R. 238 (also in Whyte and Lederman, op. cit., at 8-40).
See also R. v. Dominion Stores Ltd. (1977), 37 C.C.C. (2d) 20 (Ont. H.C.), rev'd
(1978), 18 O.R. (2d) 496, 39 C.C.C. (2d) 127 (C.A.).
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Instead of using the Constitution as a positive document flexible enough to
facilitate a provincial involvement in broadcasting that is justifiable on a
practical basis, the courts have adopted a negative approach, which seems to
be more concerned with identifying ways in which provincial initiatives might
be regarded as impinging on the perceived exclusivity of the conventional
federal sphere of power.'"
In its theoretical aspects, this argument for judicial functionalism is not
new,14 nor has it been fully developed or exhaustively explored in the real
contexts in which it might be made operational. The theory acquires cogency
only when demonstrated to be efficacious in particular situations without doing
damage to established constitutional doctrine or to the precepts of principled
decision making that are intrinsic both to the adjudicatory model in which
Canadian constitutional decisions are primarily made, and to the general con-
ception of responsible judicial decision making. It will be demonstrated that
a court that is capable of reasoning the substantive validity of provincial in-
volvement in general broadcasting regulation need not be restrained by legal
process concerns about the constitutional role of the courts in giving effect
to that provincial involvement.
At the outset, some comment should be addressed to the utility of any
conclusions that might flow from this analysis. In view of the current political
process of constitutional change, which includes a re-evaluation of the juris-
diction of powers over broadcasting, 15 it might be argued that the inadequacy
of judicial analysis of general content concerns in broadcasting will be resolved
by fundamental constitutional change outside the judicial process. However,
in view of the volatile state of Canadian federalism, this may be a false hope.
As was remarked in a report of the latest constitutional conference:
Irony feeds on paradox, and nothing is more paradoxical in contemporary Cana-
dian politics than constitutional reform.
Politicians talk incessantly about it, knowing perfectly well that the subject
scarcely stirs ordinary voters. This public apathy, particularly acute in English
Canada, gives politicians room to manoeuvre while allowing them the luxury of not
moving at all.1 6 [Emphasis added.]
Realizing the practical impediments to fundamental constitutional change, and
acknowledging that there is a valid role for the provinces to play in participat..
ing in the regulation of general broadcasting content, it is crucial to provide a
means by which, through accepted constitutional principles, a functional
sharing of control over general broadcasting content can be effected.
13 The more appropriate response of the courts, and one that has doctrinal support,
is to seek to uphold valid provincial legislation. See Scott v. Scott (1891), 4 B.C.R. 316
(Full Ct.); Montreal Trust v. Abitibi, [1943] 3 D.L.R. 1 (P.C., Alta.); and N.S. Bd. of
Censors v. McNeil, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 662, 84 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
14 See note 125, infra, for citations and discussion.
15 See The Canadian Bar Association, Committee on the Constitution, Towards a
New Canada (Montreal: The Canadian Bar Foundation, 1978) at 117-24. See also True-
man, supra note 10; and Simpson, "Mask Slips, And Truth on Provinces Is Revealed,"
The Globe and Mail, 8 Feb. 1979 at 7.
10 Simpson, id.
1980]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
II. THE ACCEPTED CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION AND ITS
ORIGIN: FROM THERADIO REFERENCE TO THE CFRB CASE
As Hogg has noted1" in reference to an analysis by Mullan and Beaman,' 8
"The regulation of programme content is a politically controversial issue."
However, the political contentiousness of the matter arises only because the
legal system has not dealt with the content question in practical terms. In part,
as noted earlier, this is because The British North America Act, 1867, does not
address directly the concept of broadcasting. In larger measure, however, the
inadequacy of the legal analysis is due to the courts' failure to infuse the Con-
stitution with sufficient validity and vitality with respect to broadcasting to
allow it to meet the demands of the matter.
Federal jurisdiction with respect to broadcasting exists primarily by
virtue of the combination of section 92(10) (a) and section 91 (29) of The
British North America Act, 1867, and the residual "Peace, Order and Good
Government" ("POGG") power of section 91. Section 92(10) (a) reads as
follows:
92 In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to ...
(10) Local Works and Undertakings other than such as are of the following
classes:
(a) Lines of ... Telegraphs, and other Works and Undertakings connecting
the Province with any other or others of the Provinces, or extending
beyond the Limits of the Province;
and, when read in conjunction with section 91 (29), has been determined to
encompass radio and television broadcasting by an ejusdem generis clas-
sification.'9
What is not clear, however, despite analyses in some of the relevant cases
that assert the contrary, is the comprehensiveness of the word "undertaking" in
section 92(10). In the Radio Reference,20 Viscount Dunedin attempted to
analyze this problem. His words have created substantial confusion about the
capacity of this case to support federal jurisdiction with respect to broadcast-
ing content. In summarizing the basis of federal jurisdiction set out in section
92(10) (a), he said:
Broadcasting as a system cannot exist without both a transmitter and a receiver.
The receiver is indeed useless without a transmitter and can be reduced to a nonen-
tity if the transmitter closes. The syst.rm cannot be divided into two parts, each
independent of the other.
"Undertaking" is not a physical thing but is an arrangement under which of
course physical things are used. 21 [Emphasis added.]
17 Supra note 1, at 336, 339. Note: reference to Report, supra note 1.
18 Supra note 1.
19 Hogg, supra note 1, at 338-39; Shaw, supra note I, at 29-30; McNairn, supra
note 2, at 358-59; Report, supra note I, at 302.
20 Supra note 3.
2 1 Id. at 315 (A.C.), 92 (D.L.R.). This is the only ground upon which the Radio
Reference supports federal jurisdiction in this area, because its reliance on POGG to sup-
port a federal treaty-making power, with which the case was significantly concerned, was
"repudiated" five years later in A.G. Can. v. A.G. Ont., [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.) [herein-
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Later cases have attributed wide significance to the meaning of "undertaking"
defined to be an arrangement comprehending more than physical things,
22
and have specifically included the substance -of what is broadcast. However,
to accept this proposition is to ignore both the plain meaning of Viscount
Dunedin's words, and the context in which the case was argued. At issue
was Canada's capacity to undertake international obligations with respect to
the trans-international border use of the radio frequency spectrum, the inter-
national aspect of which may itself have coloured the Privy Council's approach
to the problem. More important, however, is the fact that the Privy Council
was not requested to, and did not purport to, address the issue of broadcast-
ing content. The question referred to the judicial body read:
Has the Parliament of Canada jurisdiction to regulate and control radio communi-
cation, including the transmission and reception of signs, signals, pictures and
sounds of all kinds by means of Hertzian waves, and including the right to deter-
mine the character, use, and location of the apparatus employed?23
When Viscount Dunedin's statement is read in the context of the question
before the Court and the analysis undertaken in the course of the reasons, it
becomes more plausible to regard his use of the word "arrangement" as in-
clusive of all facets of the medium and process of the distribution, including
physical and non-physical aspects, but not including the quality or substance
of that distributed. His reference to "transmission' and "reception" connotes
the extent to which non-physical components of broadcasting are included in
the federal power. However, these terms reflect technical, non-physical distri-
bution aspects of broadcasting signal propagation which are released from
and received by physical "apparatuses" that are more easily conceived to be
within the federal jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in the context in which these
terms are used, it is neither reasonable nor necessary to attach any qualitative
or content-oriented meaning to these words. The reference to "signs" and
"signals" in the question considered by the Privy Council does not relate to the
substance of that which is decided to be within federal jurisdiction. Rather,
these words, which prima facie have a qualitative aspect, are merely des-
criptive of the scope or types of radio communication distribution that the
federal jurisdiction includes.
It is submitted that the Radio Reference should be recognized only as
supporting the proposition that the Parliament of Canada has jurisdiction to
regulate the physical and non-physical components of the process by which
radio and television communication is distributed. However, academic com-
mentators and courts have not read the case in this way.
For example, McNairn has analyzed the meaning of "undertaking" in
determining the extent of an intra-provincial undertaking 24 In the course of
his discussion, he reasons:
after Labour Conventions case]. See also Report, supra note 1, at 303-04; and Hogg,
supra note 1, at 336.
22 Re CFRB and A.G. Can., [1973] 3 O.R. 819, 38 D.L.R. (3d) 335 (C.A.). For a
discussion of "works" and "undertakings," see Hanssen, The Federal Declaratory Power
Under the BNA Act (1968), 3 Man. LJ. 87.
23 Radio Reference, supra note 3, at 310 (A.C.), 87 (D.L.R.).
24 Supra note 2.
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[A]n undertaking cannot be broken down, so as to subject it to different legislative
jurisdictions, into separate local and long distance businesses when in fact the two
types of operations are carried on as an integrated undertaking.25 [Emphasis added.]
In examining the words emphasized in this sentence, and the example of
trucking used in the text to support it, it is evident that the author conceives
of an "undertaking" as a "distributional" or "medium of connection" concept.
Furthermore, his understanding of "undertaking" as a business entity or
enterprise operation, which again is a facet of the medium of distribution, is
typical of the interpretations that have been attached to "undertaking" since
the Radio Reference, as is apparent in the Victoria Cablevision case. 20
If the foregoing analysis is applied to broadcasting, it is arguable that
broadcasting content can be separated from the system that conveys it, at
least for the purpose of jurisdictional analysis. Even if it could be argued
that shipments of transport companies that engage in interprovincial operations
are amenable to federal jurisdiction, unlike broadcasting content, there is
nothing intrinsically provincial about such shipments aside from the geo-
graphical extent of their progress through the distribution system. However,
that which is broadcast is of a character that is qualitatively separate from the
process that carries it, and may as a result have a separate jurisdictional
nature.
The other basis of federal jurisdiction in broadcasting is asserted to be the
residual POGG power, vesting in Parliament control over broadcasting by
section 91 of The British North America Act, 1867.27 In the Victoria Cable-
vision case, although McLean J.A. was prepared to rely on the 92(10) (a)
argument in the Radio Reference, he reasoned that the Radio Reference
established federal jurisdiction over broadcasting on the basis of section 91.
However, because McLean J.A. failed to acknowledge the context of the
section 91 argument in the Radio Reference, which related to the capacity of
the POGG power to support a federal treaty making power, and which was
overruled in the Labour Conventions case, 28 his conclusions about the POGO
power in broadcasting are not useful except to show that the POGG power
is invoked in this area.
The most important case-in fact the only case-basing federal juris-
diction with respect to broadcasting content on the POGG power is the decision
of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Re CFRB and A.G. Can.20 In the case,
radio station CFRB was prosecuted under section 28 of the Broadcasting Act 0
for broadcasting partisan political comment on the date of an election.
Section 28 is one of what may be referred to as general, non-province-specific
content standards intended to achieve general content objectives such as
25 Id. at 374.
26 Re Public Utilities Comm'n and Victoria Cablevision Ltd. (1965), 51 D.L.R. (2d)
716, 52 W.W.R. 286 (B.C.C.A.).
27 See Hogg, supra note 1, at 336; Report, supra note 1, at 362; and Mullan and
Beaman, supra note 1, at 71, 74.
28 Supra note 21.
29 Supra note 22.
30 R.S.C. 1970, c. B-I 1.
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Canadian content programming and broadcasting decorum, but which is not
directed particularly at matters of local or regional concern. Because of the
nature of the offence, in arguing the case, counsel was compelled to contest
the constitutionality of general content standards contained in the Broadcasting
Act.
In responding to the constitutional argument in the case, Kelly J.A.
chose not to examine the meanings of the content provisions in the Broad-
casting Act. Analogizing instead the cases decided with respect to aeronautics,
he asserted that on a "national dimensions" test of POGG;
Radio communication has attained such dimensions as to affect the body politic of
Canada and so under the heading of "making laws for the Peace, Order and Good
Government of Canada" Parliament is exclusively empowered to legislate as to the
control of radio communication undertakings.3 '
It is submitted that Kelly J.A.'s analysis in the case is both insubstantial
and cryptic. What are the attributes of the "dimensions" that "radio com-
munication" is perceived to have attained? Is the "body politic" a mono-
lithic concept, or are particular aspects of it acutely sensitive to the impact of
"radio communication"? For that matter, is "radio communication" itself an
amorphous concept? These and other issues relevant either directly or by
necessary implication to the content question in a constitutional context were
not evaluated in the case. Nevertheless, Kelly J.A.'s reasons call for close
scrutiny, since the case has been interpreted as standing unequivocally for
the proposition that federal jurisdiction extends to broadcasting content.
In the first instance, the aeronautics analogy invoked to support the POGG
justification for federal control of broadcasting pays no heed to the practical
imperatives present in a case like Johannesson v. West St. PauP2 that are not
present in broadcasting. As the aeronautics cases demonstrate, the location of
airports is an essential part of the distribution network within which air travel
functions. In the American context, McNairn has pointed out 33 that federal
control over aeronautics is in substance predicated on federal control over the
instrumentalities of flight, which have no special provincial character apart
from geographical placement.34 Because the sizes of airports are directly cor-
related with the sizes of airplanes that use them, and because of necessary
safety measures to protect areas surrounding airports in respect of matters
ancillary to, but of the same character as, the distributional process of air
travel, exclusive federal control over aeronautics can be justified on the basis of
the "national dimensions" test of POGG.
The same concerns that make the "national dimensions" test of POGG
acceptable in justifying federal control over aeronautics are not necessarily
present in the broadcasting context. Independently of the process of distri-
3' Re CFRB and A.G. Can., supra note 22, at 823 (O.R.), 339 (D.L.R.).
32 [1952] 1 S.C.R. 292, [1951] 4 D.LR. 609. See infra note 78, at 30, for comments
on the vagueness of Kelly J.A.'s discussion of POGG.
33 McNairn, Aeronautics and the Constitution (1971), 49 Can. B. Rev. 411 at 425.
34 In view of the s. 92(16) argument made later in this paper, it is appropriate to
note that "local" in that section requires more than one territorial confinement to one
province.
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bution and matters ancillary to it, broadcasting programming may be directed
specifically toward particular interests and aspirations that are exclusively
local in character. Moreover, accepting that the process of broadcasting
distribution falls within federal competence, the regulation of some facets
of programming content under colour of provincial legislation need in no way
impair or interfere with the allocation of frequencies, the operation of the
frequency spectrum, the operation of transmitters or receivers, or the general
content standards ostensibly with respect to programming integrity, which are
set out in section 3 of the Broadcasting Act.
The second basis of Kelly J.A.'s conclusion was the case of A.G. Ont. v.
Winner.35 At issue in that case was an attempt by the New Brunswick govern-
ment to prohibit the operation of "an interprovincial or international highway
bus undertaking."' 6 Paraphrasing the Winner decision, Kelly l.A. said:
[When the undertaking was a bona fide interprovincial undertaking, the carriage
of passengers from points within the Province to points outside and between
two points within the Province was beyond the control of the Province ....
Mhe qualifying condition to exclude provincial law-making authority and to at-
tract the exclusive power of Parliament was the presence of either works or under-
takings connecting one province with another or extending beyond the limits of
the Province.37
As Kelly J.A. seems to have realized, the Winner case stands for the
proposition that an undertaking, in the sense of a business enterprise, attracts
federal jurisdiction when some part of its operation, no matter how pro-
portionally small, is interprovincial, notwithstanding that the specific activity
of concern takes place entirely within the Province.
Even though the "undertaking" analysis took place in the course of a
discussion of the "national dimensions" test of POGG, the fact that the
analysis, predicated on a highway transportation analogy, was even employed
is curious. In the Winner case, "undertaking" was interpreted to mean
"business enterprise," and, as noted, the case is accepted as authority for the
proposition that even a small proportion of interprovincial operation will result
in an otherwise intra-provincial undertaking being amenable to federal
jurisdiction. If the Winner analogy is applied consistently, it would seem
that an entirely intra-provincial broadcasting undertaking should be outside
federal control.
In order to reach the conclusions with respect to jurisdiction over broad-
casting content reached by Kelly J.A. in the CFRB case, it is necessary to
interpret the Winner case to mean that mere use of an interprovincial medium
of distribution, in that case highways connecting provinces, results in users
of that medium being amenable to federal jurisdiction, notwithstanding that
their entire undertaking might be intra-provincial or locally conceived and
oriented. This is not a proposition that flows from Winner. However, applying
Kelly J.A.'s "logic" to broadcasting content, he in effect reasoned that the
constitutional jurisdiction over broadcasting content is not determinable by
35 [1954] A.C. 541, [1954] 4 D.L.R. 657 (P.C.).
SORe CFRB and A.G. Can., supra note 22, at 823 (O.R.), 339 (D.L.R.).
37 Id. at 824 (O.R.), 340 (D.L.R.).
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the substance of that content (the nature of the enterprise or operation, as
in Winner) but by the mere use of the radio frequency spectrum, control over
which does reside in the Parliament of Canada. This conclusion is both too
simple, insensitive to the disaggregation of matters of programme distribution
and programme substance, and is based on a legal non sequitur if it purports
to rest on the Winner analysis. 38
Indicative of the deficiency of analysis that pervades the broadcasting
decisions are comments made in the course of the CFRB case that suggest that
certainty about federal jurisdiction over broadcasting content is illusory.
Sensitive to the possibility that the Radio Reference, the foundation of all
cases discussed in this paper, may indeed be as narrow as this analysis
suggests, Kelly J.A. asserted that an absence of precedent was no bar to the
conclusions about jurisdiction over content that he was determined to reach.
He said:
Even if it be assumed that the decision in the Radio Reference case was intended
to declare only the carrier system to be exclusively a subject for the legislativejurisdiction of Parliament, then the decision in that case at best is silent as to the
right of Parliament to control and regulate the intellectual content of the material
disseminated by the operation of the carrier system. Since there is no binding
precedent holding that the control and regulation of the intellectual content is
beyond the competence of Parliament, it would be flying in the face of all practical
considerations and logic to charge Parliament with the responsibility for the regu-
lation and control of the carrier system and to deny it the right to exercise legis-
lative control over what is the only reason for the existence of the carrier system,
i.e., the transmission and reception of intellectual material.39
It is not clear how Kelly J.A. determined that practical imperatives necessitate
the allocation of intellectual content exclusively to the federal sphere of
jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is not acceptable that an unreasoned "common
sense" type of approach be a surrogate either for the perceived legal position
or for an inquiry into countervailing considerations of broadcasting practice
that consciously or unconsciously have been ignored. What is clear, however,
is that the line of analysis predicated on the Radio Reference may be ill-
conceived in attempting a priori to allocate content control to the federal
authority.
From a consideration of the constitutional position preceding the most
recent attempts to attribute the regulation of broadcasting content to the
federal jurisdiction, it appears that reliance on the perceived doctrinal position
may be tenuous. Not only has it been shown that the Radio Reference is
inadequate authority upon which to base federal jurisdiction over the intel-
lectual matter of broadcasting, but also it has been demonstrated that cases
built upon the Radio Reference have added little substance to the federal
claim over content apparently codified in the Broadcasting Act. The crucial
question now is: Do the Capital Cities, Dionne, and Kellogg's cases merely
38 The Capital Cities case, supra note 6, at 619, seems to accept the Winner analogy
insofar as it relates to the trans-border carriage of goods. However, it would seem, on
this paper's analysis, that this analogy has only limited application, confined to the "pro-
cess of distribution" context.
3 ) Re CFRB and A.G. Can., supra note 22, at 824 (O.R.), 340 (D.L.R.).
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adopt the insubstantial doctrinal foundation described above, or do they in
fact create a more cogent explanation and justification for federal jurisdiction
with respect to broadcasting content?
III. RENAISSANCE OF CONTENTION: THE RECENT CASES
As noted in the introduction to this paper, three recent Supreme Court of
Canada decisions reinvigorate the utility of exploring the constitutional justi-
fication of exclusive federal control over broadcasting content, as it has been
so baldly asserted in the CFRB decision and perhaps in section 3 of the
Broadcasting Act 0
In November, 1977, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered its decision
in the case of Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Tele-
vision Commission.41 Among other things, at issue in the case was the juris-
diction of the Canadian Radio-Television Commission (CRTC) under the
Broadcasting Act2 to regulate cable distribution systems that receive and
distribute television signals.43 Briefly stated, the issue was whether the Broad-
casting Act was intra vires the Parliament of Canada in conferring such juris-
diction on the Commission.
Pursuant to one of its policy statements, the CRTC had amended the
licenses of several cable television companies to permit these companies to
delete at random commercial messages contained in U.S. programming
received from Buffalo, and to substitute therefor public service announce-
ments. The aim of the policy was to encourage the cable companies to enter
contracts with Canadian television stations to insert such replacement signals.
The Supreme Court found that the CRTC does have the jurisdiction to
enforce this kind of policy and that the conferring of this jurisdiction was
intra vires the Parliament of Canada.
In constitutional terms, the case was concerned with whether section
92(10) (a) and section 91(29) of The British North America Act, 1867,
remove from provincial competence the regulation of cable distribution
systems. In practical terms, the point of contention was whether the inter-
position of an intermediate receiver by the cable companies for the inter-
ception and re-transmission of signals resulted in a bifurcation of jurisdiction
pursuant to the constitutional division of powers. Essentially, as in the Victoria
Cablevision44 and Dionne45 cases, the Court determined that the broadcasting
40 This will be explored infra. In capsule form, the argument is that the content
requirements of s. 3 of the Broadcasting Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-11, are so vague in scope
and potential application as to be no more than general standards aimed at decency
(broadly defined), integrity, and nationalistic requirements in programme content. Ac-
cordingly, provincial jurisdiction with respect to specific content matters of intrinsic pro-
vincial significance would not necessarily be inconsistent with the s. 3 objectives.
41 Supra note 6.
4 2 R.S.C. 1970, c. B-11.
43 Supra note 6, at 615.
44 Supra note 26.
45 Supra note 7.
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and distribution of television signals comprised a single, integrated undertaking
however it might be technologically constructed 46 and that extra-provincial
signals intercepted for re-transmission within the geographical confines of one
province did not tend to "divided constitutional jurisdiction over the under-
taking of such systems. '47
Although prima facie the case appeared to be one directly concerning the
jurisdictional implications for the intra-provincial manipulation of certain
aspects of broadcasting content, the case was neither argued nor adjudicated
in this context. In the judgment, substantial reliance was placed on the Radio
Reference in order to assert federal jurisdiction over the transmission and
reception of radio and television signals as elements of a network of distri-
bution by means of which such communication takes place. Indeed, the entire
substance of the Capital Cities case on the constitutional question before the
Court was distributional in focus, and directed toward ascertaining an
absolute division of legislative responsibility over broadcasting.
However, in concluding his constitutional analysis, Laskin C.J.C. seemed
prepared to view control over content as being subsumed in a general federal
control over anything to which the label "broadcasting" might be attached.
He said:
I am therefore in no doubt that federal legislative authority extends to the regula-
tion of the reception of television signals emanating from a source outside of Can-
ada and to the regulation of the transmission of such signals within Canada. Those
signals carry the programmes which are ultimately viewed on home television sets;
and it would be incongruous, indeed, to admit federal legislative jurisdiction to the
extent conceded but to deny the continuation of regulatory authority because the
signals are intercepted and sent on to ultimate viewers through a different tech-
nology. Programme content regulation is inseparable from regulating the under-
taking through which programmes are received and sent on as part of the total
enterprise. 48
Unfortunately, the conclusions of the Chief Justice on this issue are no more
than that and, being devoid of introspective analysis, they betray a misunder-
standing of the complexities inherent in modem broadcasting, and indicate
an unnecessary and poorly reasoned extrapolation of the substantive manner
in which the case was presented to the Court.49 Counsel argued the consti-
tutional issues in terms of an absolute division of control over the medium, or
means, of distribution of broadcasting signals, an approach too stark to
appreciate the subtleties of potential sharing of jurisdiction with respect to
some forms of programme content. However, instead of restricting his reasons
to the distributional issue, the Chief Justice attempted to find within the process
of distribution sufficient justification to warrant a virtually unquestioned
46 This is consistent with the "enterprise" view of "undertaking."
47 Capital Cities, supra note 6, at 610.
48 Id. at 623.
49 As might be expected, the tactics of argument adopted by counsel have influenced
these broadcasting decisions. However, the courts seem not to have kept this in mind in
so easily extending general and distributional arguments to encompass broadcasting con-
tent jurisdiction.
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allocation of content control to the federal Parliament. In referring to the
Radio Reference, he stated:
[Ilt is difficult to understand how there can be a constitutional basis for federal
licensing of receiving sets in a Province, or even of transmitting apparatus which
sends signals by way of international and interprovincial transmission. To put the
matter in another perspective, it would be as if an interprovincial or international
carrier of goods could be licensed for such carriage but without federal control of
what may be carried or of the conditions of carriage.
This submission amounts to a denial of any effective federal legislative jurisdic-
tion of what passes in interprovincial or international communication, whether by
radio or television, and is in truth an invitation to this Court to recant from the
Radio case. It would, presumably, leave federal authority in relation to "tele-
graphs" intact, although reducing the meaning of that head of power from the
meaning attributed to it by the Privy Council in the Radio case.5 0
With respect to this line of reasoning two things may be said. In the first
instance, the reference to the transportation of goods is an incomplete and
unclear analogy. As noted by Hogg5' and McNairn, 52 the jurisdiction over the
transportation of goods is divided between the provincial and federal levels
of government, although the cases of Coughlin v. Ontario Highway Transport
Bd.53 and R. v. Smithss effectively confer on the provinces legislative juris-
diction with respect to interprovincial and intra-provincial carriage of goods
by highway transport, through a mechanism of administrative interdelegation
and anticipatory referential incorporation. Moreover, the federal jurisdiction
with respect to interprovincial carriage of goods is dependent on the carrier's
being an "interprovincial undertaking." If the analogy employed by the Chief
Justice is pursued, it might be argued that broadcasting undertakings confined
to a province on a territorial basis should be amenable to provincial regu-
lation, for, as the examination of the Winner analogy has suggested, 5 the
federal authority with respect to interprovincial undertakings cannot be
dependent on the nature of the medium or process by which distribution takes
place, even accepting that federal control will extend to at least some matters
of the substance of distribution in appropriate cases. Rather, the allocation
of jurisdiction must depend on the character of the undertaking itself. Accord-
ingly, if a broadcasting undertaking operating in a province does not direct
its activity to or have as its object the interprovincial carriage of signals, and if
programme content is intrinsically local for reasons other than the territorial
extent of its propagation, then there would appear to be a supportable case
for provincial legislative involvement.
Ancillary to the foregoing argument, and apparent in the remarks of the
Chief Justice, is the international orientation of the Capital Cities case which
may have coloured the approach of the Court to the jurisdictional question.
50 Capital Cities, supra note 6, at 622.
51 Supra note 1, at 338.
52 Supra note 2. The entire article is helpful in assessing the limits of federal power
under the exception of s. 92 (10) (a) of The British North America Act, 1867.
,5 [1968] S.C.R. 569, 68 D.L.R. (2d) 384.
54 [1972] S.C.R. 359.
55 See notes 35-37, supra, and accompanying text.
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Indeed, it may have been easier for the Court to reach the conclusions that
it reached with respect to broadcasting content because the subject of concern
was the international transmission and reception of foreign radio-television
signals. The arguable necessity of federal jurisdiction in international matters
of broadcasting content is implicit in the judgment.
The other point worthy of comment with respect to the reasons of the
Chief Justice is his contention that to assert other than federal control over
content regulation would be to "recant from the Radio case." As this paper has
attempted to show, neither by necessary contextual implication nor by express
reference did Viscount Dunedin direct his mind to the issue of content. In fact,
an interpretation of the Radio Reference consistent with its facts and the state
of development of radio technology in 1932 attributes to federal control only
the process of distribution of broadcasting signals, leaving the content ques-
tion open.o
Swinton has had similar misgivings about the logical implications of the
Capital Cities case for programme content regulation, remarking:
Laskin C.J.C. had no doubts as to federal competence to regulate content, at least
when foreign television signals are distributed.... The reasoning underlying this
conclusion is not too clear, for it rests, in part, on traditional federal authority to
license radio receivers, a basis which does not appear to lead to a conclusion that
Parliament can regulate the content of material received. The conclusion would
be more convincing had His Lordship looked to a rationale for content control by
the federal Parliament, based on the scarcity of broadcast frequencies. Frequencies
available for broadcasting are limited, and the federal Parliament must decide on
a way to allocate them between competing users.57
However, even Professor Swinton seems not to have appreciated the possible
independence of the content concept, notwithstanding her identification of the
56 In Dionne, supra note 7, at 198 (S.C.R.), 185 (D.L.R.), Pigeon J. in dissent re-
corded the remarks of Anglin CJ.C. made during the Supreme Court of Canada's con-
sideration of the Radio Reference. These remarks suggest that the Radio Reference, not-
withstanding its subsequent adjudication by the Privy Council, should be read in its con-
text. Furthermore, Anglin CJC.'s conception of the issue before the Court was that of
a "process of distribution" nature, as the following quotation, cited by Pigeon J., dem-
onstrates:
In dealing with this reference, however, I desire it to be clearly understood that I
do so solely in the light of the present knowledge of Hertzian waves and radio and
upon the facts disclosed in the record. I fully accept the following paragraph from
the judgment of my brother Newcombe:
"I interpret the reference as meant to submit the questions for consideration in
the light of the existing situation and the knowledge and use of the art, as prac-
tically understood and worked, and, having regard to what is stated in the case,
assumed as the basis for the hearing. Therefore I proceed upon the assumption
that radio communication in Canada is practically Dominion-wide; that the
broadcasting of a message in a Province, or in a territory of Canada, has its
effect in making the message receivable as such, and is also effective by way
of interference, not only within the local political area within which the trans-
mission originates, but beyond, for distances exceeding the limits of a province,
and that, consequently, if there is to be harmony or reasonable measure of
utility or success in the service, it is desirable, if not essential, that the opera-
tions should be subject to prudent regulation and control." [Emphasis added.]
57 Swinton, Advertising and Canadian Cable Television-A Problem in International
Communications Law (1977), 15 Osgoode Hall LJ. 545 at 574-75.
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inconsistency in the Capital Cities judgment, for she has suggested that Laskin
C.J.C.'s content conclusion might be more convincing if it had been related
to the allocation of radio frequencies as a scarce resource. Frequency alloca-
tion, however, is just one dimension of the regulation of the means of distri-
buting broadcast signals. Furthermore, accepting federal jurisdiction over the
distribution system, and assuming a fully allocated frequency spectrum, the
constitutional contention for exclusive federal control over the substance of
that which is carried does not seem to be imperative. Equally important, this
contention is arguably not supportable either on the basis of the pre-Capital
Cities doctrine or on the basis of the reasoning in the case.
Also in November, 1977, the Supreme Court of Canada decided the
Dionne case.58 The issue in this case was substantially the same as that in the
Capital Cities and Victoria Cablevision cases. Pursuant to section 23 of the
provincial Public Service Board Act,59 the Quebec Public Service Board had
purported to authorize certain parties to the Reference "to operate cable
distribution enterprises in certain defined areas in the Province" and to settle
"certain questions touching the carrying out of the authorizations."' 0 Given
its decision in the Capital Cities case, the Supreme Court of Canada had little
difficulty in determining that section 23 of the Quebec Public Service Board
Act was ultra vires the competence of the Provincial legislature insofar as it
has been determined to be beyond provincial competence to regulate cable
distribution of television signals. As in the Capital Cities case and the Victoria
Cablevision case, the fundamental ground for the Court's decision was its
perception of the process of transmission, intermediate reception, and retrans-
mission by cable to the ultimate receivers of the transmission as essentially
an integrated undertaking not amenable to divided jurisdiction under the
Constitution. For this conclusion, reliance was again placed on sections
92(10) (a) and 91(29) of The British North America Act, 1867.
Laskin C.J.C., who delivered the reasons of the Court, stated:
The fundamental question is not whether the service involved in cable distribution
is limited to intraprovincial subscribers or that it is operated by a local concern but
rather what the service consists of .... [Where television broadcasting and re-
ceiving is concerned there can no more be a separation for constitutional purposes
between the carrier system, the physical apparatus, and the signals that are received
and carried over the system than there can be between railway tracks and the
transportation service provided over them or between the roads and transport ve-
hicles and the transportation service that they provide. In all these cases, the in-
quiry must be as to the service that is provided and not simply as to the means
through which it is carried on. Divided constitutional control of what is functionally
an interrelated system of transmitting and receiving television signals, whether di-
rectly through air waves or through intermediate cable line operations, not only
invites confusion but is alien to the principle of exclusiveness of legislative autho-
rity, a principle which is as much fed by a sense of the constitution as a working
and workable instrument as by a literal reading of its words.0 '
58S upra note 7.
59 R.S.Q. 1964, c. 229.
60 Dionne, supra note 7, at 192 (S.C.R.), 179 (D.L.R.).
6lId. at 194 (S.C.R.), 181 (D.L.R.). The Winner analogy again is invoked to sup-
port federal jurisdiction over all broadcasting. However, as was suggested above, the
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Noticeably absent from these reasons is any direct reference to content juris-
diction, which was not a specific issue in the case. However, the tenor of the
Court's reasons suggests that all matters of a radio-television communications
nature are subsumed under the term "broadcasting," at least for the purpose
of division of powers classification. Nonetheless, for the Court to proceed in
this way, as it has in other cases, is to ignore the expressly distributional
context of the problems being adjudicated, and, as a direct consequence, to be
insensitive to legitimate provincial concerns about content.
It is not denied that constitutional and regulatory convenience concerns
militate in favour of federal jurisdiction over the process, tangible and in-
tangible, by which broadcasting communication takes place, but these argu-
ments, based on the section 92(10) (a) and POGG powers in The British
North America Act, 1867, do not necessarily stretch to encompass content
regulation. This proviso bears repetition as a foundation for an alternative
analysis.
In a dissentG considerably stronger than that in the Capital Cities case,
at least insofar as it may be referable to jurisdictional concerns with respect to
general broadcasting content, Pigeon J. seemed to recognize the functional
issues confronting the Court. Perceptively, he realized that a noncontextual
invocation of section 92(10) (a) cannot be the terminus of a jurisdictional
analysis of the complexities that inhere in "broadcasting":
It must be stressed that by virtue of the above noted provisions [92(10) (a)] pro-
vincial jurisdiction over all undertakings is the rule, federal jurisdiction being the
exception. With reference to undertakings of the kind wih which we are presently
concerned it is to be noted that telegraph lines are specially included among pro-
vincial jurisdiction because exception is made only of those which connect the
Province witl another or extend beyond its limits.6 3 [Emphasis added.]
"railway tracks" argument is difficult in that it ignores the essential proposition in Win-
ner, which is that the character of the undertaking, and not the medium by which it
travels, is determinative of constitutional jurisdiction. Hogg, supra note 1, at 322, ob-
serves that:
Legislative jurisdiction over trains, buses, trucks ... depends primarily on whether
they are operated as part of an interprovincial (or international) undertaking, in
which case jurisdiction is federal under 92(10)(a), or whether they are operated
as part of an intraprovincial undertaking, in which case jurisdiction is provincial
under 92(10).
Although there have been cases that assert federal jurisdiction on the basis of the physi-
cal connection of a local line of communication with an interprovincial line, this result
depends on the degree of "operational integration" between the connecting undertakings
as enterprises of transportation or communication (Hogg, op. cit., at 329). Thus, where a
provincial undertaking is operated as a branch of an interprovincial undertaking, then
the local undertaking is deemed to be part of the interprovincial undertaking. However,
the connection must not be merely physical but must be operational (Hogg, op. cit., at
343). As Hogg notes, citing as authority Toronto v. Bell Telephone Co., [1905] A.C. 52
(P.C.), there are many provincially regulated telephone companies in Canada notwith-
standing their participation in the national telephone distribution network.
02 Dionne, id. at 196 (S.C.R.), 182 (D.L.R.) ff.
03 Id. at 199 (S.C.R.), 184 (D.LR.). Pigeon J. notes that, with the exception of the
Bell Telephone Company of Canada, the telephone companies are under provincial juris-
diction. See note 61, supra.
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These comments can be extended to exempt certain forms of programme
content from federal jurisdiction just as easily as Laskin C.J.C.'s reasons here
and in the Capital Cities case can be extrapolated to expand federal jurisdic-
tion in this regard. However, any inferences that may be drawn from this case's
dissent, while attractive in view of the legitimate provincial interest in broad-
casting content which will be examined later in this paper, are as restricted as
the implications for an expansion of federal jurisdiction over content, which
seems to be the law, for, notwithstanding Pigeon J.'s apparent sensitivity to
an expanded provincial role in broadcasting, his reasons were couched in the
same distributional context as the reasons of the majority. Until the content
question is faced on its own footing, however, independent of the method
by which programme content is distributed, the exclusivity of federal juris-
diction in legislating standards to be applied to general broadcasting content
cannot be satisfactorily questioned.
The third recent case reflective of the law with regard to constitutional
jurisdiction over general broadcasting content, and also indicative of the
Supreme Court's attitude, and perhaps of its confusion, in adjudicating on this
issue is the decision in A.G. Que. v. Kellogg's Co. of Canada.64 In this case,
provincial consumer legislation prohibiting the use by advertisers of cartoons
in advertising directed at the child audience was held to be intra vires the
province of Quebec in extending the prohibition to encompass cartoon adver-
tising on television. Ostensibly, the legislation was found to be valid because
it was directed at the advertiser-manufacturer of the product rather than at
the broadcaster.
Notwithstanding the reasoning of the Court that the effect of the
legislative restriction on broadcasting content was only ancillary or incidental
to otherwise valid provincial consumer legislation, a close reading of the
legislation and the judgment suggests that the statutory provision was more
a colourable attempt to invade recognized exclusive federal jurisdiction.
Moreover, the interest of the province of Quebec in attracting jurisdiction
over all broadcasting matters had been a subject of constitutional litigation
in the major broadcasting case immediately preceding the Kellogg's caseP5
and in fact is a matter of express representation by that province in the current
constitutional debate. Accordingly, that the Supreme Court of Canada, so clear
in the Capital Cities and Dionne cases in rejecting provincial claims to ex-
panded broadcasting jurisdiction, should be receptive to a better disguised, but
nevertheless disguised, provincial initiative to acquire authority in the broad-
casting area is difficult to understand.
When juxtaposed with the previous broadcasting cases, the Kellogg's
case clearly raises the analytical tensions that constitute the subject of this
paper. Effectively, the result of the case is to provide for use by the provinces
a constitutional conduit by which they can successfully intrude into a legis-
lative realm purported to be within exclusive federal competence. The head-
note in the Kellogg's case accurately reflects the tenor and substance of the
judgment:
64 Supra note 8.
65 The Dionne case, supra note 7.
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The fact that broadcasting is within the exclusive federal jurisdiction does not
prevent valid provincial consumer protection legislation from controlling television
advertising.
Provincial legislation otherwise valid, is not invalid because, incidentally, it
affects a federal power.66 [Emphasis added.]
Apparently, the provinces can acquire not only a legislative interest in certain
broadcasting matters, but also control, if the legislative mechanism is ap-
propriately constructed. If jurisdiction over broadcasting content can be
appropriated by a province this easily, the inevitable question must be: Should
the jurisdictional issues raised by broadcasting programme content not be
addressed directly in a way that harmonizes regulatory convenience, provincial
interest, and constitutional doctrine?
The Kellogg's case contains a short and trenchant dissent by Laskin C.J.C.
The Chief Justice recognized the patent artificiality of accepting provincial
legislation as anything except legislation in relation to broadcasting and, in
particular, with respect to the general content of broadcasting. Implicitly,
Laskin C.J.C. relied on the "national concern" test of the POGG power
vested in Parliament by virtue of section 91 of The British North America
Act, 1867, in asserting a pervasive federal control over broadcasting. He said:
We are concerned rather with the right to resort to a particular medium which is
within exclusive federal competence, and the generality of the challenged provin-
cial legislation and Regulation does not aid the Province in extending its prohibi-
tion of advertising to a medium which is outside its legislative jurisdiction.0? [Em-
phasis added.]
In incorporating the "national concern" doctrine into his analysis, the Chief
Justice referred to the case of Johannesson v. West St. Paul, an "aeronautics"
case. However, beyond identifying his reliance on the POGG power as invoked
there, Laskin C.J.C. did not explore the rationale for its use in the aeronautics
context-a rationale that may not be and, arguably, is not present with respect
to broadcasting content. 68
Having recognized the extreme colourability of the provincial legislation
before the Court, Laskin C.J.C. was content to rely on his understanding of
applicable precedent, generally developed in non-broadcasting-content anal-
yses, to affirm federal jurisdiction over programme content. This is unfortunate
because the case presented a clear opportunity to consider the content issue
66Supra note 8, at 211 (S.C.R.), 314 (D.L.R.). Martland J. saw the case as one con-
cerned not with the transmission and reception of broadcasting signals or with under-
takings engaged in that business, but as one dealing with the regulation of "the conduct
of a commercial enterprise in respect of its business activities within the Province. The
majority of the Court of Appeal appears to hold the view that the federal power in re-
spect of broadcasting undertakings is decisive. I do not think that it is . . " (Kellogg's,
op. cit., at 221 (S.C.R.), 320 (D.L.R.).)
07 Id. at 214 (S.C.R.), 316 (D.L.R.). In asserting this, Laskin C.J.C. accepts the
McKay test of concurrency (see text accompanying notes 113-15, infra). However, the
McKay case stands by itself and seems to have been superseded by the "direct conflict"
approach to concurrency, or paramountcy.
08 See text accompanying notes 32-35, supra, for a discussion on this point.
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unencumbered with the complexities of international signal transmission,6D
cable distribution, 70 and absolute division of authority which have hampered
consideration of jurisdiction over content in previous cases.
Collectively, the cases, and therefore the doctrine set out in Parts II and
III of this paper, provide the apparent foundation for the allocation of control
over general broadcasting content to the federal Parliament, and through
Parliament to the CRTC. Upon close consideration of this very small body of
precedent, however, only a limited amount of it is concerned directly with
content at all. Moreover, none of the cases analyzes content in a way ap-
preciative of the subtleties in its substantive character which may be a basis
for a very real division or sharing of jurisdiction with respect to broadcasting
content. Accordingly, a number of matters are remarkable.
First and foremost, the Radio Reference is not determinative of exclusive
federal jurisdiction over broadcasting content. Accordingly, the cases that rely
on it as the basic, and often sole, support for federal control over programme
content do so on tenuous grounds.
Of equal importance is the fact that most of the relevant cases, including
the Radio Reference, are directly concerned with the process by which radio
or television signals are distributed rather than with the particular substance,
or qualitative nature, of what is distributed. The Broadcasting Act, section 3,
is consistent with a scope of jurisdiction no more extensive than this. More-
over, the general content standards contained in the Act 7' are not inconsistent
with an interpretation restricting their application to matters of broad integrity
of content, in line with certain nationalistic aspirations, but not directed to
content subjects that may be described as intrinsically local, or province-
specific in character, and are therefore of inherent provincial legislative interest.
A reinterpretation of the main broadcasting cases demonstrates a process
of analysis by the courts that is only loosely akin to the "What is the matter?"
procedure of constitutional investigation. In fact, the courts' conception of
broadcasting has been so monolithic that this conventional mode of analysis
appears to have been ignored or to have depreciated in importance. This
approach not only raises concerns about the courts' appreciation of the
substantive law concerned, but also demonstrates an attitude of the courts,
and of the Supreme Court of Canada in particular, that contains an implicit
rejection of the appropriateness of functional analysis as an apposite basis for
an imaginative investigation of the division of powers in relation to broad-
casting.
An alternate, and perhaps more useful, approach originates in an acknow-
ledgement that broadcasting, in its contemporary complexity, is unanticipated
by The British North America Act, 1867. Accordingly, the relevant question
becomes: What are the relevant functional concerns and, within existing
doctrinal precepts, how can the optimal allocation of these concerns between
0 9 The Capital Cities case, supra note 6.
70 Id. See also Dionne, supra note 7.
71 R.S.C. 1970, c. B-11. See also Report, supra note 1, at 305; and Atkey, supra
note 1, at 258-60.
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the provincial and federal levels of government be effectuated? 72 The Supreme
Court of Canada does not appear to have considered this question.
On the assumption that precedent may be constitutionally neutral on the
appropriateness of provincial involvement in the regulation of general broad-
casting content, the remainder of this paper will attempt to answer the above
question by examining: (a) some aspects of the "national concern" approach
to POGG as may apply to broadcasting; (b) the legal, theoretical, and practical
legitimacy of provincial interest in broadcasting, and how that interest may be
made operational within a legislative and regulatory framework that is con-
sistent with conventional constitutional doctrine; and (c) the attitude of the
Supreme Court and how a reorientation of its perception of its role in the
adjudication of broadcasting matters could facilitate a more satisfactory
resolution of the issues raised in respect of general broadcasting content.
IV. DEFINING THE PROVINCIAL ROLE: A MODEL
A. "National Concern" and the POGG Power
Although it is not the intention here to re-analyze the development of the
"national importance" test of the residual POGG power in section 91 of The
British North America Act, 1867, as it has been expanded through the case
law,73 it is essential to address the doctrine since its increased utility as a
broad basis for federal control over broadcasting 74 must be faced before pro-
vincial legislative involvement in the area can be asserted more positively.
Potentially, the "national importance" test of POGG is a flexible means by
which federal jurisdiction can be invoked with respect to matters not enumer-
ated in either section 91 or 92. The precise application of this test, or at least
its expression, may at the same time have been expanded and confused in
the Anti-Inflation Reference.75 Nevertheless, its general character has been
retained insofar as broadcasting analysis is concerned.
Precisely because the test has the potential to be so easily applied, it is
submitted that considerable caution and careful analysis are required before
72 N.S. Bd. of Censors v. McNeil, supra note 13.
73 See Russell v. The Queen (1882), 7 App. Cas. 829, 2 Cart. B.N.A. 12 (P.C.);
A.G. Ont. v. A.G. Can., 1896] A.C. 348, 5 Cart. B.N.A. 295 (P.C.) [hereinafter Local
Prohibition case]; A.G. Ont. v. Canada Temperance Federation, [1946] A.C. 193, [1946]
2 D.LR. 1 (P.C.); Johannesson v. West St. Paul, supra note 32; Munro v. National
Capital Comm'n, [1966] S.C.R. 663, 57 D.L.R. (2d) 753; and Reference Re Anti-Inflation
Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 452, 9 N.R. 541 [hereinafter Anti-Inflation
Reference].
74 Hogg, supra note 1, at 336. See Anti-Inflation Reference, id. at 455-56 (S.C.R.),
524 (D.L.R.), 616 (N.R.) per Beetz J.
7 5 Although this confusion is not material to the argument of this paper, useful dis-
cussions of the reasons in the Anti-Inflation Reference may be found in McDonald,
Peace, Order and Good Government: The Laskin Court and the Anti-Inflation Reference
(1977), 23 McGill L.J. 431; and Chevrette and Marx, Commentary (1976), 54 Can. B.
Rev. 732.
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it is used.76 In reviewing the utility of POGG as it may apply to broadcasting
content, it is perhaps wise to be mindful of Laskin C.J.C.'s warning in the
Anti-Inflation Reference in addressing the need for caution in employing the
"national concern" test:
Lord Atkin said of Lord Watson's words (in the Local Prohibition case (1896)
A.C. 348) that "They laid down no principle of constitutional law and were cau-
tious words intended to safeguard possible eventualities which no one at the time
had any interest or desire to define. .. "
It is my [Laskin C.J.C.'s] view that a similar approach of caution is demanded
even today, both against a loose and unrestricted scope of the general power and
against a fixity of its scope that would preclude resort to it in circumstances now
unforeseen. 77
In assessing POGG as it could apply to broadcasting, it is the contention
of this paper that the Gibson "provincial inability" approach is probably most
useful in determining the extent to which the residual power in section 91
should be permitted to remove from provincial competence any legislative
jurisdiction with respect to broadcasting content. Gibson's thesis is most use-
fully explained by setting it out in his own words:
Mhe [POGGI power is merely residual in nature; it can operate only in the ab-
sence of relevant provincial jurisdiction. This, it is submitted, is the key to the
puzzle: a matter has a national dimension to the extent onlv that it is beyond the
power of the provinces to deal with it.7s [Emphasis added.]
The argument proceeds:
Having regard to the residual nature of the power ... "national dimensions" are
possessed by only those aspects of legislative problems which are beyond the ability
of the provincial legislatures to deal with because they involve either federal com-
petence or that of another province. Where it would be possible to deal fully with
the problem by co-operative action of two or more legislatures, the "national di-
mensions" concerns only the risk of non-co-operation, and justifies only federal
legislation addressed to that risk.70
Finally:
It is important to emphasize however that the entire problem would not fall within
federal competence in such circumstances. Only the aspect of the problem that is
beyond provincial control would do so. Since the [POGG] clause bestows only
residual powers, the existence of a national dimension justifies no more federal
legislation than is necessary to fill the gap in provincial power.S0
Gibson's argument is quoted at length because its lucidly expressed con-
tention is important in all its aspects to the position taken in this paper.
Applying the above argument to broadcasting content, notwithstanding valid
exclusive federal jurisdiction over the process of distribution of broadcasting
76 See LeDain, Sir Lyman Duff and the Constitution (1974), 12 Osgoode Hall L.J.
261 at 279; and Lederman, Unity and Diversity in Canadian Federalism: Ideals and
Methods of Moderation (1975), 53 Can. B. Rev. 597 at 604.
77Supra note 73, at 412 (S.C.R.), 487 (D.L.R.), 578 (N.R.). See also Pigeon, "The
Meaning of Provincial Autonomy," in Lederman, ed., The Courts and the Constitution
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1964) 35 at 37.
78 Gibson, Measuring National Dimensions (1976), 7 Man. LJ. 15 at 33.
79Id. at36.
8 0Id. at 34.
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signals, the regulation of province-specific matters of general content should
be within provincial competence where the subject matter is intrinsically local
in character and of no particular interest to other provinces or the nation as a
whole, and where provincial involvement would not interfere with either the
viewer enjoyment of the citizens of other provinces, or with the process of
distribution under federal control. If the provinces may accept legislative
jurisdiction with respect to some matters of content regulation, then federal
legislative competence based on POGG should limit that role only to the ex-
tent necessary to achieve interprovincial co-operation in appropriate areas.8 '
If, on the Gibson view of POGG, provincial competence with respect to
certain specific subject matter of general programme content is not precluded,
and if federal power under section 92(10) (a) is restricted to distribution mat-
ters, as argued earlier in the paper, it is necessary to determine the head of
power in section 92 of The British North America Act, 1867, under which
provincial broadcasting authority can reside.
B. Provincial Interest
1. Legislative Competence and Rationale
As a condition precedent to conventional constitutional analysis of the
division of powers between sections 91 and 92 of The British North America
Act, 1867, the "matter" of legislation, or proposed legislation, must be iden-
tified. Section 92 is then examined to determine if the "matter" is compre-
hended within that section. Next, section 91 is examined for its capacity to
accommodate the "matter" under consideration, and, in the event that the
"matter" may fall within some part of both sections 91 and 92, doctrines of
mutual modification or paramountcy are applied to resolve any conflict.m
As the analysis in Parts II and III of this paper outlines, Canadian
courts have treated "broadcasting" as a single matter comprehended within
the federal communications power supported either by sections 92(10) (a) and
91(29) or by the residual POGG power in section 91 of The British North
America Act, 1867. However, as the discussion of this examination has at-
tempted to reason, "broadcasting" is capable of disaggregation into separate
matters which are "the process of distribution" and "general broadcasting
content." Moreover, "general broadcasting content" comprises both the gen-
eral content standards set out as objectives of the Canadian broadcasting
system in section 3 of the Broadcasting Act and which may be regarded as
intangible standards of distribution, and specific subjects or subject areas of
programme content in which the provinces may be argued to have a legitimate
direct interest. With respect to the latter content matters, it is submitted
81 McDonald, supra note 75, at 454-56, makes a "national institution" argument
which includes consideration of the Anti-Inflation Reference, and has much the same
impact and implications as Gibson's "provincial inability" test.
8 2 Edwards v. A.G. Can., [1930] A.C. 124, [1930] 1 D.L.R. 98 per Lord Sankey LC.
(P.C.); and Citizens Ins. Co. v. Parsons (1881-1882), 7 App. Cas. 96 per Sir Montague
Smith (P.C.). For a recent example of appropriate analytical method, see R. v. Zelensky,
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 940, 86 D.L.R. (3d) 179, [1978] 3 W.W.R. 693.
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that section 92(16) of The British North America Act, 1867, provides a
suitable basis for provincial legislative involvement, the exercise of which
need not be in conflict with the broader federal jurisdiction over other mat-
ters of content by virtue of the Broadcasting Act.83
Under the authority of section 92(16) of The British North America
Act, 1867, provincial legislatures are competent to legislate with respect to
"generally all matters of a merely local or private nature in the province."
Essentially, this section is the provincial residual power.84 As Lederman has
noted:
Now with respect to these left-over parts, [matters which do not fit the specific heads
of 91 or 92] we are down to interpretative competition between the two residuary
clauses. In these circumstances, the federal general power then embraces the left-
over part or parts of inherent national significance or importance. The provincial
residuary power in 92(16) would likewise embrace any left-over part or parts of a
merely local or private nature in the provinces. 85
However, in applying section 92(16) in conjunction with the POGG power,
care must be taken to restrict the meaning of "national significance" within
reasonable limits. As Gibson has remarked, there is very little in a modem
federation that is not of national significance or importance and "to grant
federal jurisdiction over such functions would be to make the supposedly
autonomous provincial legislatures mere 'tenants at sufferance' of the federal
Parliament. '86
The broad residual capacity of section 92(16) has been affirmed and
explained recently in the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Nova Scotia
Bd. of Censors v. McNeil.87 One of the bases upon which the Court upheld
provincial legislation dealing with, inter alia, the presentation of films in movie
theatres, was the general provincial power in section 92(16). At issue in the
case, functionally, was the capacity of the province to regulate the morality
of public performances. In the course of his judgment, Ritchie J. explained
the substance of the section 92(16) authority:
I take the view that the legislation here in question is in pith and substance di-
rected to property and civil rights and therefore valid under section 92(13) of the
British North America Act, but there is a further and different ground on which
its validity might be sustained. In a country as vast and diverse as Canada, where
tastes and standards may vary from one area to another, the determination of what
is and what is not acceptable for public exhibition on moral grounds may be viewed
as a matter of a "local and private nature in the Province" within the meaning of
s. 92(16) of the BNA Act, and as it is not a matter coming within any of the
classes of subjects enumerated in s. 91, this is a field in which the legislature is
free to act.
83R.S.C. 1970, c. B-11. On the argument of this paper, s. 92(10) of The British
North America Act, 1867 is not the most appropriate basis upon which to found a con-
tent jurisdiction position for the provinces, since the substance of s. 92(10) appears to
relate to distributional matters, or at least seems to have been interpreted this way,
84 McDonald, supra note 75, at 452; and Hogg, supra note 1, at 346.
85 Lederman, supra note 76, at 612-13.
86 Supra note 78, at 31.
87 Supra note 13.
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In the Reference as to the validity of "An Act tp amend the Supreme Court
Act," Chief Justice Duff had occasion to say, at p. 58:
"In s. 92, No. 16 appears ... to have the same office which the general
enactment with respect to matters concerning peace, order and good govern-
ment of Canada, so far as supplementary of the enumerated subject, fulfils
in s. 91 .... ,88
Ritchie J.'s observations establish the utility of section 92(16) as a pro-
vincial residuary power, and his emphasis on the diversity of tastes and stand-
ards among provinces with respect to entertainment presentations can be
directly applied and analogized to the arguable provincial interest in regulat-
ing broadcasting content. If Ritchie J.'s comments are apposite with respect
to morality and standards of decency of entertainment presentation, which, in
the broadcasting context, this paper concedes are within federal authority
under the Broadcasting Act, then a fortiori there must be some basis on which
to argue that provincial interests with regard to provincial culture and matters
of community perception and inter-community interaction are within provin-
cial legislative competence under section 92(16) of The British North Amer-
ica Act, 1867.
Having established, prima facie, a constitutional niche that can accom-
modate provincial involvement in the regulation of broadcasting content, it is
necessary to determine whether broadcasting content can and should be char-
acterized as a matter of local concern so as to fall legitimately within section
92(16) of The British North America Act, 1867. Theoretically, such a local
interest or purpose would appear to be relatively easily established both from
the inherent nature of broadcasting communication, and from the ends that
it is capable of serving. The broadcasting system is perhaps the primary sen-
sor of community feeling and self-perception that exists, or has existed. As a
vehicle for enhancing cultural development and a focus for the identification,
expression, and critical evaluation of societal values and issues of particular
community sensitivity, the broadcasting mechanism is a network for com-
munity life and social interaction. All of these virtues of broadcasting com-
munication underlie the objective of broadcasting in Canada, contained in
section 3 of the Broadcasting Act, but well encapsulated by Henry's formula-
tion of the public interest that contemporary communications serve: "[ihe
media of communications are, in effect, the nervous system of society .... "89
The kind of human development to which broadcasting can contribute is
inherently personal, and by implication local in character. Although the
Broadcasting Act contemplates social, cultural and other objects, their for-
mulation in that federal statute is inevitably vague. Interests seeking expres-
sion by the communications system are diverse-as diverse as the individuals
and communities to which broadcasting services are extended, and from
which the substance of what is communicated is drawn. Therefore, that the
88 Id. at 699-700 (S.C.R.), 28 (D.L.R.).
89 Henry, The Combines Investigation Act and the Mass Media (1970), 8 Osgoode
Hall L.. 147 at 147.
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regulation of broadcasting content cannot, and indeed should not, be en-
trusted to one level of government is plausible.90
Building on Henry's conception of the public interest, a "folk-tale" ana-
logy employed by Swinton is most appropriate in describing the inherently
local nature of many forms of broadcasting content, the expression of which
might be given increased currency if provincial legislatures were allowed to
exercise their representative capacities to identify such local matters. Pro-
fessor Swinton's analogy is best told in her own words:
It is a recognition of the potential impact of the telecommunications (including
radio and television) media and of the uses to which these media can be put that
has led various groups to seek control over the media. Clearly, telecommunications
are an important tool for acculturation: for introducing and emphasizing the
norms of society and its heritage. In tribal societies, a story-teller - whether a
nurse, mother, or village leader - would relate folktales that told of societal
norms in a compelling way and within a concrete situation that illustrated the ap-
plication of norms and dramatized history. Television and radio, while used for
many purposes, can play to a great extent the same role as the story-teller, relating
information about the society and emphasizing what are perceived by at least some
elites to be the accepted forms for that society. 91 [Emphasis added.]
In referring to "norms" and "heritage," Swinton does not suggest the societal
extent of values implicit in these terms. However, it would seem to be a rea-
sonable inference to draw from the village context of her example that the
values that these terms are meant to encompass vary from social group to
social group, and from community to community. Certainly, across a disper-
sion of social groupings and broad human interests, these terms are not meant
to convey a monolithic conception of the values for which the "story-teller" is
a conduit.
Just as any social grouping has special norms and values peculiar to it
and deserving of particular attention, the provinces of Canada, which collec-
tively represent a complex demography, have specific concerns that deserve
expression by means of the contemporary "story-teller," the broadcasting
system. However, before the system can process and convey this information,
relevant matters of content have to be identified. Accepting the theoretical
complexity of the interests served by the modem media, it would seem that
the level of government closest to these interests is in the best position to give
them legislative expression. That level of government is the provincial gov-
ernment.
90 Boyle, Responsibility in Broadcasting (1970), 8 Osgoode Hall L.J 119 at 124-
25, 130-31. The pervasive influence of broadcasting on all aspects of daily life, and the
multiplicity of services required to meet these demands leads to the inference that broad-
casting is too complex to be left to the federal government alone when local governments
are perhaps best able to identify and serve the needs to which modern broadcasting must
address itself.
Swinton, supra note 57, at 553, refers to the need for some nation-state control
of content in the framework of international telecommunications. The same argument can
be applied to the need for at least limited provincial involvement in content regulation
within the broader national framework.
91 Id. at 546-47 n. 15. See also Harwood, Broadcasting and the Theory of the Firm
(1969), 34 Law & Contem. Prob. 491. This is a more philosophical formulation of the
public interest served by broadcasters and how it is measured.
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The practical, political justification for provincial legislative involvement
in the regulation of broadcasting content is at least as great as the theoretical.
Intergovernmental discussions about the sharing of jurisdiction with respect
to broadcasting have been going on since 1973. As Baum has observed, the
legal "solutions" to complex broadcasting problems such as those addressed
in this paper have not been satisfactory in any practical sense, and have led
to concern about entrusting these important matters to the vagaries of the
adjudicative process.92 The need for interprovincial co-operation originates
in differences among provinces in needs and circumstances,93 and has recent-
ly become manifest in the form of proposals for constitutional reform. 4 As
the Hon. John E. Brockelbank remarked at the First Federal-Provincial Con-
ference On Communications in a manner that revealed not only the urgency
with which some provinces were, and are, seeking real power in broadcasting,
but also the frustration arising from the inability to achieve such authority:
[lit is essential that we recognize the broadcasting system as being more than ex-
clusively national and that local and provincial needs have not been adequately
realized by the national institutions or agencies. It is essential that the Provinces
be in a position to direct and inflence the development of broadcast services in their
areas in a way which is most appropriate to local circumstances and objectives. The
realization of local needs has traditionally been the responsibility of the Provinces.
While we must recognize a national need to allocate broadcast frequencies in an
efficient and internationally co-ordinated fashion, the clear local and provincial
aspects of the broadcasting system make it essential that this power be administered
so as to permit a provincial role in the realization of local needs and objectives.95
[Emphasis added.]
The current procedure in dealing with all societal concerns with respect
to broadcasting is entrusted to the CRTC, which has the jurisdiction to deter-
mine and enforce broadcasting policy for the entire country, within the con-
fines of the objectives of section 3 of the Broadcasting Act. Although the
CRTC's mandate is thus restricted by the Act, it still retains considerable
discretion and authority, and is in effect a "Broadcasting Parliament," a
powerful institution exercising wide policy powers.9 6
The comprehensiveness of the CRTC's authority over broadcasting and
broadcasting content raises two salient issues. In the first place, notwithstand-
ing the conduct of hearings throughout the entire country, the CRTC is a
central government institution and is perceived as such. Secondly, and more
importantly, however, the Commission is an appointed body, an independent
regulatory agency accountable only to the federal government, but not to
92 Baum, Broadcasting Regulations in Canada: The Power of Decision (1975), 13
Osgoode Hall LJ. 693 at 727.
9 3d.at 729.
94 See supra note 15.
95 Baum, supra note 92, at 731 n. 126. As noted by Atkey, supra note 1, at 215; and
Mullan and Beaman, supra note 1, at 73, the Aird Commission in 1928 advocated giving
the provinces control over broadcasting content. This was the first official recognition of
the provincial interest in broadcasting. Moreover, the Commission seemed to recognize
the distinction between technical matters of broadcasting (to remain under federal juris-
diction), and programming matters (in which the provinces should be involved).96 Baum, id. at 722, and at 715-22 for further discussion.
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those whose lives it directly influences and shapes through its policy develop-
ment process9 7
From the foregoing, the fundamental concern that must emerge, given
some constitutional support for a provincial role in the regulation of broad-
casting, is whether the CRTC should have the broad, and in many respects
undefined, powers that it does have. In its ostensibly "legislative" capacity the
CRTC has no direct mandate from the societal interests that it is required to
represent, and is not accountable to those interests except indirectly through
Parliament. In the presence of potential provincial legislative capacity, at
least with respect to broadcasting content, it is submitted that the CRTC
should be required to defer to content policies representative of provincial
interests.
Paul Weiler has succinctly summarized the representative function of a
legislative body:
The rationale for a federal system is that the various kinds of statutory decisions
should be made by the legislative body which is responsive to the electorate-na-
tional or local-which has the major interest in the results of the decision.98
It is a strong argument that the legislature most responsive to social needs
should legislate with respect to them. A fortiori, and especially on matters of in-
tensely focused public concern, legislators rather than government appointees
should formulate fundamental matters of policy.09 The legislators are repre-
sentative of the social and cultural matters that broadcasting communication
exists to reflect and serve, and legislators are directly accountable to those
who hold these interests.
Perhaps the most current manifestation of the practical climate of change
in which jurisdictional issues about broadcasting are being raised is the recent
collection of proposals for constitutional change contained in a report by the
Canadian Bar Association entitled Towards a New Canada.100 Recognized in
97It is true that the CRTC conducts public hearings and allows non-party inter-
venors to speak pursuant to the CRTC Rules of Procedure, C.R.C. 1978, c. 375, ss.
13-19. However, intervenors are responsible only to themselves and to the limited interests
that they represent. They are not responsible to the general electorate and their positions
are not necessarily representative of community interest or of standards generally; yet, it is
community interest that is relevant in policy formulation and application.
08 Weiler, The Supreme Court and the Law of Canadian Federalism (1973), 23 U.
Toronto LJ. 307 at 313.
9 Provincial governments, through independent corporations, are now permitted a
greater role in defining the needs and content of educational television. The bases for this
authority are contained in the Broadcasting Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-11, s. 27; the Direc-
tion to the CRTC on the Reservation of Cable Channels For Educational Broadcasting;
and the Direction to the CRTC on Ownership by Provinces or Their Agents (reproduced
in Grant, Canadian Communications Regulation, Part 1: Statutes, Regulations and Proce-
dures Relating to Broadcasting and Cable Television (Page Proofs, Restricted Distribu-
tion, Law Soc. of Upper Canada, 1978)). Provincial Acts that take advantage of this
procedure include: The Alberta Educational Communications Corporation Act, S.A.
1973, c. 3; The Ontario Educational Communications Authority Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.
311; and The (Saskatchewan) Educational Communications Corporation Act, 1974, S.S.
1973-74, c. 35.
100 Supra note 15.
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the report is the practical need to provide provincial legislative capacity in
matters of local or provincial concern in broadcasting. The Association has
recommended, inter alia, a system of federal control over the radio spectrum
and technical distribution aspects of broadcasting but concurrent federal-
provincial jurisdiction with federal paramountcy over broadcasting undertak-
ings.1 1 However, in proposing the concurrency approach, with provision for
the federal authorities to vacate their licensing power in favour of the prov-
inces, the Bar Association has realized the inherent instability of the proposal.
Recognizing that the power might easily fall within exclusive federal control,
the writers of the report have observed:
[I]n the case of certain matters the granting of concurrent jurisdiction is necessary
because it is not possible to determine in the abstract the boundary line between
national and local interests and ... it must be worked out in context between the
two levels of government. It follows that concurrent powers must be approached
in accordance with the obvious spirit of the constitution. It is in the end necessary
in the field of telecommunications to give federal paramountcy in the national
interest but that is not intended to give carte blanche to the federal government to
occupy the whole field.'0 2 [Emphasis added.]
While the report has identified explicitly and implicitly many of the con-
cerns with which this paper deals, it has two flaws. Of these, the least signi-
ficant is the lack of specificity in describing how the concurrency proposal
might work in practice, and in the context of the Broadcasting Act. More
serious, however, is the report's acquiescence in the accepted existing consti-
tutional division of powers over broadcasting with no critical examination of
the foundation of this division. The latter fault is material in two respects.
The report is predicated on the necessity of fundamental constitutional change
in order to effect a real recognition of provincial legislative competence in
certain aspects of broadcasting and broadcasting content. Given the present
pace of constitutional change, the provinces may wait a long time for solu-
tions to current jurisdictional problems in broadcasting.
A corollary of this observation is the importance of finding a jurisdic-
tional solution in accepted constitutional doctrine in order to provide the
provinces with at least an arguable constitutional claim over some matters
affecting broadcasting. In the present context of constitutional negotiation of
broadcasting issues, the provinces are essentially cast in the role of suppli-
cants to the federal domain. They have nothing with which to bargain, or on
which to build a case for legislative participation in broadcasting. An impor-
tant goal of this paper has been to show that the provincial position, at least
theoretically, is not as barren as it may seem. Although the Supreme Court
of Canada might not be eagerly responsive to the proposals in this paper if
they were presented to that Court, the proposals do seem to have some
cogency in law, and might furnish the provinces with a stronger negotiating
position in this area. At the very least, they demonstrate that jurisdictional
issues in broadcasting cannot be solved as easily as the courts believe.
101 Id. at 122.
102 Id. at 124.
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2. The Proposed Solution
Prevalent in the case law is an implicit belief that regulatory convenience
demands a central regulator, thereby foreclosing any provincial regulatory
involvement. However, it is arguable that the provinces should have some
legislative jurisdiction to implement broadcasting content policies directed at
matters of intrinsic provincial significance.
It is submitted that by a process involving concurrently operative legisla-
tion with federal paramountcy, and administrative interdelegation, the prov-
inces may be permitted the opportunity to legislate on matters of general
broadcasting content of a provincial character. 0 3 After a province has exer-
cised its legislative capacity, this mechanism envisages a delegation of the
regulatory implementation of this legislation to the CRTC, which would ad-
minister the provincial policy and its own matters of regulatory concern as a
unit.
This procedure, premised on the existence of a valid provincial legisla-
tive capacity, need not impair the functioning of the regulatory process and
might even improve the quality of CRTC decision making by providing legis-
lative guidance to the particular meanings that various provinces attach to
such terms as "the cultural, political, social, and economic fabric of Canada,"
which are set out in section 3 (b) of the Broadcasting Act.0 4 As has been
argued, the Act sets general content standards of an ostensibly objective nature,
concerned with general programming quality, matters of a national nature,
and integrity and decency (in the broadest sense) of programme content. The
coexistence of these general standards with province-specific content legislation
is not impossible or necessarily impractical and is probably desirable. 10 5
The validity of the procedure suggested here depends upon whether the
doctrines of administrative interdelegation and concurrency will countenance
it as a solution. Of the two concepts, the interdelegation issue is probably
easier to resolve in this context. Accordingly, it will be examined first.
Although direct legislative interdelegation is not permitted by The Brit-
ish North America Act, 1867,106 the Supreme Court of Canada has upheld
the device of administrative interdelegation.' 07 Using this technique, the body
with legislative competence in an area enacts legislation and then entrusts the
103 McNairn envisages the use of this kind of approach in the regulation of aeronau-
tics, citing United States and Australian experience in dividing jurisdiction over air trans-
port between the national and state levels of government. The states are entrusted with
matters of economic regulation, while the national level of government assumes respon-
sibility for air safety and navigation. While the U.S. and Australian constitutional bases
differ from Canada's, the comparison is instructive in showing the practical possibilities
of divided jurisdiction that could be applicable procedurally in the broadcasting context,
See supra note 33, at 424-26.
104R.S.C. 1970, c. B-11.
05 See text accompanying note 71, supra, for an explanation of the objectives of
s. 3 of the Broadcasting Act.
106A.G.N.S. v. A.G. Can., [1951] S.C.R. 31, [1950] 4 D.L.R. 369 [hereinafter In-
terdelegation case].
107 P.E.I. Potato Marketing Bd. v. Willis, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 392, [1952] 4 D.L.R. 146.
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implementation of that legislation to a regulatory agency of the other juris-
diction, essentially on regulatory convenience grounds. In effect, the enacting
jurisdiction chooses to invest with its regulatory mantle the executive of the
other jurisdiction, which is regulating those aspects of the same or similar
subject matter within its competence. -
In the relatively recent cases of Coughlin v. Ontario Highway Transport
Bd.'08 and R. v. Smith, 09 the administrative interdelegation procedure was
expanded by its permitted combination with the technique of anticipatory
referential incorporation.,' The effect of this is to vest in the "donee" juris-
diction not only the responsibility of administering the enactment of the
"donor" jurisdiction, but also to provide for the incorporation in the dele-
gated enactment the present and future legislative changes made by the
"donee" jurisdiction to its own parallel legislation. Although the functional
effect of this is to permit one jurisdiction to legislate in areas in which it has
no constitutional competence, perhaps overborne by the pragmatism of the
process, the Supreme Court of Canada has effectively removed the funda-
mental prohibition of legislative interdelegation in Canada."
In applying the interdelegation procedure to the scheme described in
this paper, little needs to be said beyond an elaboration of the applicable
doctrine. The operability of the scheme is of course dependent on the exist-
ence of provincial legislation which is of a sufficiently local or private nature
to be accommodated by section 92(16) of The British North America Act,
1867. However, if the substantive validity of provincial legislative involve-
ment in broadcasting can be established, the procedure of administrative
interdelegation would seem to provide a functional method by which that
provincial interest can be implemented in a framework of administratively
central regulation.
Just as the interdelegation doctrine appears to be elastic enough to facili-
tate the sharing of broadcasting content jurisdiction suggested in this paper,
so the law on concurrency or paramountcy can be invoked in further support.
The origin of the test for concurrency is in the paramountcy doctrine which
represents the proposition that "when there are inconsistent (or conflicting)
provincial and federal laws (each of which is valid) it is the federal law
which operates."" 2 The jurisdictional solution proposed in this analysis pos-
tulates federal control over general content standards and national objectives,
with provincial legislative competence with respect to content matters of
particular interest to the individual provinces, such as cultural matters. Ac-
108 Supra note 53.
109 Supra note 54.
110 A.G. Ont. v. Scott, [1956] S.C.R. 137, 1 D.L.R. (2d) 433.
IllLysyk, Constitutional Law-The Interdelegation Doctrine: A Constitutional
Paper Tiger? (1964), 47 Can. B. Rev. 271 at 278. The dissent in Coughlin recognized
the patent artificiality of the process of effectively permitting legislative interdelegation.
However, even though the Smith court must have been cognisant of these countervailing
concerns, it upheld the device. See also Hogg, supra note 1, at 229, 230; and Weiler,
supra note 98, at 316.
12 Hogg, id. at 102.
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cordingly, the concurrency doctrine is crucial to the success of this paper's
proposals.
The difficult aspect of concurrency analysis is deciding the nature and
extent of conflict required before a provincial law will be declared to be in-
operative. The broadest of the concurrency tests is the "conflict of policy"
view, which contends that in the event of a policy or legislative intention
conflict between otherwise valid federal and provincial laws, the federal Par-
liament is deemed to have occupied the field with its legislation, excluding
the operation of any provincial statute with the same or similar policy ob-
jectives.113
The "policy conflict" test does not appear to be that which currently
prevails. The test more likely to be applied is the narrower "direct conflict"
approach to paramountcy. 114 This test was originally characterized in the case
of O'Grady v. Sparling, where it was determined that both a federal and a
provincial law could operate since "both provisions [could] live together and
operate concurrently." 115
Perhaps the most recent expression of the "direct conflict" test was by
Morden J. in Multiple Access v. McCutcheon,"0 approved without extended
reasons by Jessup J.A. in the Ontario Court of Appeal.11 In the case,
Morden J. applied the narrow test of concurrency to resolve a conflict be-
tween the insider trading provisions of the Canada Corporations Act 18 and
The [Ontario] Securities Act." 9 Rendering judgment, he said:
[Elach piece of legislation looks to the same 'direct loss' or 'direct benefit or ad-
vantage' and in this regard creates the same correlative rights and liabilities. It is
impossible for each of the two provisions to operate concurrently with respect to
this single loss-or single benefit or advantage. 120 [Emphasis added.]
Apparently, in Ontario at least, the "direct conflict" test of concurrency is
very narrow, contemplating an impossibility of concurrent operation before
the provincial legislation will be declared to be inoperative.
On the "direct conflict" test of paramountcy or concurrency, which ap-
pears to be the test currently accepted, the coexistence and concurrent opera-
tion of provincial legislation with respect to specific content matters and the
general content standards in the Broadcasting Act is possible. It is submitted
113 McKay v. The Queen, [1965] S.C.R. 798, 53 D.L.R. (2d) 532.
114 Colvin, Custody Orders Under the Constitution (1978), 56 Can. B. Rev. I at 9,
gives a brief discussion of paramountcy. Hogg, supra note 1, at 103, 109, says that the
effect of recent cases is to confine the paramountcy doctrine to one of express contradic-
tion.
115 [1960] S.C.R. 804 at 811, 25 D.L.R. (2d) 145 at 153. For further support of
the "direct conflict" test, see Mann v. The Queen, [1966] S.C.R. 238, 56 D.L.R. (2d) 1;
Ross v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 5, 42 D.L.R. (3d) 68; and Robin-
son v. Countrywide Factors Ltd., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 753, 72 D.L.R. (3d) 500.
116 (1977), 16 O.R. (2d) 593, 78 D.L.R. (3d) 701 (M-C.).
117 (1978), 19 O.R. (2d) 516, 86 D.LR. (3d) 160 (C.A.).
118 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-32, ss. 100.4, 100.5.
119 R.S.O. 1970, c. 426, ss. 113, 114.
12OSupra note 116, at 596 (O.R.), 704 (D.L.R.).
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that direct conflict of legislation can be avoided if each level of government
were to be confined, and to confine itself, to its own area of practical and
legislative interest.
C. The Courts: The Key to Change
If, as is contended, there is doctrinal support for the involvement of the
provinces in broadcasting programming content legislation, and if there is a
mechanism whereby this role may be made operational, then the final hurdle
to achieving such provincial involvement is the attitude and doctrinal orien-
tation of the courts in examining provincial claims for legislative jurisdiction
in this area. The courts' well-entrenched conception of broadcasting jurisdic-
tion has been distressingly one-dimensional and "absolute control" oriented.
Of considerable influence in restricting provincial competence in broadcasting
regulation has been judicial self-perception, as reflected in the negative analy-
sis of the broadcasting cases. No more evident are these attitudinal and judi-
cial self-perception aspects of constitutional adjudication in broadcasting than
in the CFRB and Capital Cities cases, and in the dissent in the Kellogg's
case. The reasoning in these cases betrays an almost indignant incredulity,
however doctrinally expressed, that the provinces should pretend to claim
jurisdiction with respect to matters of general broadcasting content. Un-
fortunately for the courts, the self-evidence of provincial non-involvement in
this area is considerably diminished on careful and more imaginative analysis.
The courts must make a concerted effort to avoid doctrinaire, abstract
analyses that direct The British North America Act, 1867 toward an unde-
sirable and unnecessary state of atrophy.121 Referring to the work of Pro-
fessor Davis, whose ideas are entirely apposite in this regard, Strayer has
remarked that "there is a certain judicial tendency to convert difficult questions
of fact into presumptions of law."' 22
At the very least, to avoid the negative consequences of difficult ad-
judication that Strayer has identified, a functional approach to constitutional
decision making is required. It is essential to examine what the law of the
constitution is intended to do and how it can, within its legal context, be used
to facilitate the creative resolution of contemporary social problems or issues
with proper cognizance of the circumstances in which those issues arise and
within which the legal solution must operate.
Strikingly, though not evident in the broadcasting decisions dealing
121 In spawning the "living tree" metaphor of constitutional adjudication, the judg-
ment in Edwards v. A.G. Can., supra note 82, characterized the B.N.A. Act as an organic
document, capable of responding to changing social circumstances in a constitutionally
principled and well reasoned manner. The alternative is the kind of rigidity described by
Lord Atkin in the Labour Conventions case, supra note 21, as the "watertight compart-
ments" approach to division of powers adjudication.
122 Strayer, Judicial Review of Legislation In Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1968) at 153. See also at 27, 28, 148, 149; and Whyte and Lederman, supra
note 12, at 4-17, where Lederman discusses the importance of relating the legal system
and that which takes place within it to the "social, economic, and cultural realities, and
to the accepted values and beliefs of the country concerned."
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with content jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Canada now seems to recog-
nize the importance of a functional approach to constitutional problems, sug-
gesting that the manner in which the broadcasting cases have been presented
to the Court has hampered their resolution in a more doctrinally expansive
way. For example, when contrasted with his remarks in the Capital Cities,
Dionne, and Kellogg's cases, Laskin C.J.C.'s reasons in the case of R. v.
Zelensky'm are not easily reconciled, at least on the level of the approach to
constitutional adjudication.
The constitutionality of compensation provisions in the Criminal Code
was at issue in the Zelensky case. With respect to Matas S.A.'s comparison
of the procedure in a civil action for damages and the position of a defendant
in this kind of action with a person's similar status under section 653 of the
Criminal Code, from which comparison an adverse constitutional conclusion
had been reached, Laskin C.J.C. remarked:
I do not disagree that in assessing constitutionality there is merit in such an ap-
proach, but relative advantages in applicable procedures cannot, in my opinion, be
determinative of validity where the primary consideration is a more junctional one,
with regard being had to the object of the impugned legislation and its connection
with other admittedly valid aspects of the criminal process. It appears to me that
in his stress on the comparison above noted, Matas J.A. has put answer before
question .... 2 4 [Emphasis added.]
In the approach that the courts have taken to jurisdiction over broadcast-
ing content, the phrase "has put answer before question" has particular
significance. In the three most recent broadcasting cases that form the basis
of this examination, factors of regulatory convenience militating against divided
jurisdiction in broadcasting have been accepted as compelling. Therefore, it
has been relatively easy for the courts to find established doctrine to support
exclusive federal jurisdiction over broadcasting content. However, to accept
this approach as necessarily excluding other conclusions which might be more
rational in the circumstances concerned is to ignore the essential malleability
of Canadian constitutional law, and the effectively functional base upon
which it is founded. Perhaps the best recognized, and extremely articulated,
view of this inherent functionality is that of Paul Weiler, who envisages this
pragmatic approach to the constitution in his "marching in pairs" metaphor:
What is distinctive about the judge-made "law" of Canadian federalism is that our
constitutional doctrines are always expressed in very abstract formulae and there
are at least two opposing formulae for every situation .... When an area of law is
shot through with verbal standards such as these, marching in pairs, the Court is
always given a choice between two alternative decisions. Instead of there being legal
rules having an intrinsic content shaping or channelling the decision in one direc-
tion or another, we have legal rationalizations which the court can use in its opin-
ion to protect its choice whatever it might be.' 2 5 [Emphasis added.]
Lest a cynical view of constitutional adjudication be inferred from this
128 Supra note 82.
124 Id. at 948 (S.C.R.), 184 (D.L.R.), 708 (W.W.R.).
125 Supra note 98, at 364. Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision Making (1968),
46 Can. B. Rev. 406 at 429. For other comments on the judiciary's "outmoded and unduly
narrow conception of the role of law in the courts," see Weiler, In the Last Resort: A
Critical Study of the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1974) at 4.
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paper's adoption of "Weiler realism," it should not be forgotten that a process
of selective application of constitutional precedent does not relieve judges of
- the responsibility of reaching reasoned, principled decisions. To the contrary,
it places on Canadian judges an even greater responsibility derived from the
realization that inherent in the reasoning and adjudicating process exists a
panoply of concerns that influence not only the results of decisions, but also
the way in which they are reached. 20 Decisions that command respect do so
not only because of their thoroughly principled character, but also because
of their thorough sensitivity to underlying real considerations that must be
articulated in a doctrinal framework in order to acquire legal efficacy. For-
midable judicial effort is required even to articulate these underlying con-
cerns. Yet, as the balance of this paper argues, in examining legislation with
implications for the regulation of broadcasting content, Canadian courts can
aspire to this higher order of decision making within existing doctrinal pre-
cepts.12 7
The final concerns must be the extent to which the Supreme Court's
commitment to precedent may impede the application of functional analysis
to broadcasting legislation as it may in the future develop and the method by
which these functional concerns can be placed before the Court.
Within the analytical framework of the constitutional placement of legis-
lative and regulatory authority over the general content of broadcasting, the
issue of precedent, or stare decisis, is a pressing one. After only a relatively
small number of decisions, not all of which address the content question
directly, courts, and the Supreme Court of Canada in particular, have rea-
soned themselves into a corner of provincial exclusion from which extrication
will be difficult.
However, the Supreme Court of Canada is no longer rigidly bound by
precedent. The relevant concern now is identifying the circumstances in which
it will be considered advisable for the Court to depart from its previous deci-
126 Weiler, In the Last Resort, id. at 158, 227.
127It has been presumed throughout this paper that constitutional decision making
will continue to take place in an adjudicative model (see Weiler, Two Models of Judicial
Decision Making, supra note 125, at 426, 430, 470). Weiler discusses the operation of
both the adjudicative model and a policy model (op. cit., at 463). While the latter model
has some persuasive force in the re-orientation of judicial decision making that Weiler
envisages, it is the contention of this paper that in view of the significant revision of
judicial attitude necessary to achieve the expansion of substantive constitutional law as
it applies to broadcasting content, this development is best left to take place within the
adjudicative model, if for no other reason than that courts are comfortable with this
model.
A complete re-orientation of the procedure of decision making could divert judges
from the attention that this paper asserts they should devote to re-evaluating the substan-
tive law, and their attitude to its operation in broadcasting matters, in order to develop a
more functional approach to the issues concerned. The adjudicative model is perceived
to foster rational, principled decision making. The basic incapacity of a rigid adjudicative
framework to accommodate the "implementation into law of new social purposes which
cannot be honestly arrived at merely by extending the reasonable implications of what has
been done before," which, Weiler alleges (op. cit., at 428), can be met in the broadcasting
content context by a more functional decision making process and a re-orientation of judi-
cial attitude as described in this paper.
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sions.lm While the persuasive force and value of precedent cannot be de-
nied, ' 2 D respect for previous decisions can only be based on the substance,
rather than the mere existence, of these decisions as they may illuminate the
problem presently before the Court. Without proper cognizance of the limits
on the utility of precedent as it may apply to changing social and legal
circumstances, the mechanical application of rules only derogates from the
satisfactory and useful resolution of legal issues.
Weiler has articulated the responsibility of judges to face the substance
of the issues to which their otherwise principled decisions must relate. In
effect, he characterizes the "law" not as an impenetrable wall but as a screen
through which precedent and the circumstances of cases must be filtered in
order to reach acceptable decisions. He has stated:
If judicial influence on the evolution of our law is an inevitable feature of the ad-
judicative role... Courts must be vitally concern2d about the policy embodied in
the legal standards they do adopt and use. Judges cannot hide ostrich-like, behind
the myth that the answers are provided in the statute books (and legal precedent),
-ready made .... mhe decisions which have already been made will be of help
to a court in delineating the social objectives it should strive to achieve. Still we
need judicial imagination in building on this foundation and judicial sensitivity to
the quality of the legal product our courts project in the future .... 1a0
The Supreme Court's previous pronouncements on broadcasting jurisdic-
tion with respect to content, as arguably tenuous as they are, should not be
a bar to the modification of that position in the future where appropriate
legislation demands such a modification. This is especially the case when it is
remembered that the broad prohibitions against provincial involvement in
broadcasting content regulation have been contained not in cases concerned
with content needs specific to the provinces or to a provincelal but in deci-
sions coloured by "process of distribution" issuesl 32 and matters of general
content standardslm in which a more careful analysis of jurisdictional con-
siderations with respect to content may not have been viewed as appropriate,
and in any case was not undertaken.
Of equal importance in establishing a basis on which judges can directly
avoid contextually inappropriate or unfortunately narrow precedent is finding
a means by which factual information can be placed before the Court to
establish the necessity and desirability of adopting a functional approach in
particular broadcasting cases. In the broadcasting content context, this infor-
mation might include extrinsic evidence of local cultural characteristics, pop-
ulation dispersions and other salient demographic characteristics, and govern-
ment policy pronouncements. How can the Court acquire the benefit of this
material?
128 Hall, Law Reform and the Judiciary's Role (1972), 10 Osgoode Hall L.J. 399
at 403.
129 Hall, id. at 401.
13 0 Weiler, In the Last Resort, supra note 125, at 37, see also at 117; and Hall, id.
at 407.
181 See Parts II and III of this paper.
132 See Capital Cities, supra note 6.
133 See CFRB, supra note 22.
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In recent years, the Supreme Court of Canada has become more flexible
in admitting extrinsic material in order to determine the purpose and effect
of impugned legislation and to show the circumstances in which that legisla-
tion was enacted. In the Anti-Inflation Reference, Laskin C.J.C. refused to
generalize about the admissibility of extrinsic material, but did admit its
utility in appropriate circumstances:
[N]o general principle of admissibility (of extrinsic evidence) can or ought to be
propounded by this Court, ... and the question of resort to extrinsic evidence and
what kind of extrinsic evidence may be admitted must depend on the constitutional
issue on which it is sought to adduce such evidence.1a4
In the same case, Beetz J. examined House of Commons Debates in his analysis
of the "national concern" and "emergency" aspects of the POGG doctrine.las
The utility of extrinsic material has been evident in other recent cases. In
Di Iorio v. Warden of the Common Jail of Montreal,136 Dickson J. referred
to British House of Commons Debates and, in particular, to statements made
before the British Parliament by the Earl of Carnarvon during the debate of
the BNA Bill, with respect to the allocation of the criminal law power. More
recently, the Supreme Court has had recourse to law reform documents in its
constitutional adjudication. In R. v. Zelensky,13r while assessing the consti-
tutional validity of Criminal Code compensation provisions, the Court ex-
amined Working Paper No. 5 of the Law Reform Commission of Canada,
October, 1974, quoting from this report in explaining the rationale and im-
plications of the Criminal Code provision under scrutiny.
Collectively, these cases illustrate a recent "opening up" of the Court to
material that must be available to the Supreme Court if it is to avoid the
theoretical abstraction that sometimes accompanies the product of constitu-
tional adjudication. In this regard, it is noteworthy that in the broadcasting
cases discussed in this paper, and in particular those concerned with content
regulation, no mention is made of attempts to address the Court with factual
material supportive of an enhanced provincial role in the area. Nevertheless,
just as precedent need no longer be a bar to a more imaginative process of
decision making, neither should a paucity of relevant factual material impair
the quality of the constitutional product.
In this last section of the paper, what may be called the legal process
section, an attempt has been made to demonstrate how the Supreme Court
of Canada can incorporate changing concepts of judicial decision making into
its consideration of regulation of content in broadcasting in order to reflect
the functional considerations that are relevant to the issue. To achieve this
result, however, the Court will have to reconsider its role in Canadian fed-
eralism. Moreover, it will have to bring to bear on broadcasting issues the
same functionalism that it has evidenced in other areas of the law. The onus
134 Supra note 73, at 389 (S.C.R.), 468 (D.L.R.), 557 (N.R.).
135 Id. at 470-72 (S.C.R.), 534-35 (D.L.R.), 629-30 (N.R.).
130 Whyte and Lederman, supra note 12, at 14-11 ff., now reported at [1978] 1
S.C.R. 15, 73 D.L.R. (3d) 491, 8 N.R. 361.
137 Supra note 82, at 952-53 (S.C.R.), 187 (D.L.R.), 701 (W.W.R.).
1980]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
is on the Court. In a subject area as complex and ever-changing as broadcast-
ing, in which social utility is a paramount concern, the approach of the Court
should be to uphold valid provincial initiatives where constitutionally possible
and convenient in a regulatory sense.
V. CONCLUSION
The objectives of this paper have been to criticize the accepted constitu-
tional doctrine which excludes provincial governments from a legislative role
with respect to general broadcasting content, and to examine the bases upon.
which such provincial involvement might validly be predicated. At the very
least, the arguments in this paper demonstrate that the courts' perception of
exclusive federal jurisdiction with respect to broadcasting content is too sim-
plistic, and is certainly not based on self-evident constitutional or practical
imperatives, or on carefully reasoned analysis. In addition, while the solution
facilitating provincial legislative involvement in broadcasting may be open to
criticism, as any such proposal may be, it does illustrate that constitutional
principles are not immutable, and are not passive servants of a doctrinal
status quo.
In the uncertain political climate within which constitutional change is
being discussed, the importance of exploiting our present Constitution to its
fullest potential cannot be underestimated. The state of negotiations with
respect to broadcasting is illustrative of this contention. It was reported that,
at the most recent Federal-Provincial Constitutional Conference: "[T]he con-
ference agreed to set aside three more complex areas of communications juris-
diction: regulation of radio frequencies, telecommunications, and regular
television broadcasting.' 38 Whatever future meetings to discuss constitutional
change in broadcasting jurisdiction may produce, it will not be produced
quickly.
Underlying the thesis of this paper and its component parts is the sub-
mission that functional constitutional adjudication is necessary in order to
realize in law the valid practical claims that the provinces may assert to legis-
late content standards of programming that is qualitatively provincial. Al-
though anachronistic in many respects, the existing division of powers will
accommodate this result if approached in an enlightened, functional way.
Moreover, Canadian courts, and Canadian judges, have it within their capac-
ity as trustees of the constitutional law to accept this challenge of progressive
adjudication, without damaging or attenuating either the principles of the
substantive law, or the way in which it is considered. The confusion that
emerges from the juxtaposition of the decisions in the Capital Cities, Dionne,
and Kellogg's cases begs for resolution. Carefully put to the Court in appro-
priate legislative form, this challenge can be met.
138 Trueman, supra note 10.
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